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MOONLIGHTING: THE PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT OF OFF-DUTY
OFFICERS
Seth W. Stoughton*
Every day, law enforcement officers across the country don their
uniforms, strap on their gun belts, and head to work. They carry the
equipment and weapons they have been issued and bear the badges
that symbolize their authority, but they are not all reporting to the
government agency that employs them. Instead, many are “moonlighting.” From directing traffic at a busy church parking lot, to making arrests at a packed nightclub, to using deadly force—uniformed
off-duty officers exercise the full panoply of police powers while
working for private employers.
The private employment of off-duty officers blurs the line between private and public policing, raising questions about accountability, officer decision-making, police-community relationships, and
the role that police agencies play in modern society. Thus far, however, the employment of off-duty officers by private companies has almost entirely evaded the attention of legal scholars. This Article is the
first to provide an empirical assessment of moonlighting in the United
States, reporting the results of an original survey of nonfederal law
enforcement agencies that collectively employ over 143,000 full-time
sworn officers, almost a fifth of all state and local officers in the country. A substantial majority of agencies—about 80%—allow officers to
engage in moonlighting, and tens of thousands of officers at those
agencies log millions of hours every year working for private employers. Yet governing law and agency policies reflect substantial variation in how off-duty employment is regulated. Moonlighting may be
the norm, but as the multitudinous justifications for it, the many issues
its raises, and the inconsistency in statutory and administrative regimes suggest, there is a strong need for attention to this area. This
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Article starts down that path by identifying stakeholders and considerations necessary to the development of professional best practices.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 14, 2013, uniformed officers with the Eastern Pike Regional Police Department were patrolling the construction site of a controversial oil pipeline near the border between Pennsylvania, New York,
and New Jersey. A civilian went to the construction site, took a series of
pictures, and allegedly yelled obscenities at construction workers. One of
the officers patrolling the construction site later wrote the individual a
summons, charging him with trespassing and disorderly conduct.1
1. Adam Federman, Kinder Morgan Paid Pennsylvania Police Department to ‘Deter Protests,’
EARTH ISLAND J. (May 21, 2015), http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/
kinder_morgan_paid_pennsylvania_police_department_to_deter_protests/.
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On October 8, 2014, a uniformed officer with the Metropolitan Police Department was patrolling the Shaw neighborhood in central St.
Louis, Missouri. He observed three men who fled shortly after seeing
him; one of the men ran in a way that led the officer to believe that he
was carrying a weapon. After a brief foot pursuit and a physical altercation, the suspect shot at the officer. The officer returned fire, killing the
suspect.2
In March 2015, a uniformed officer with the Texas Department of
Public Safety agreed to pose for a photograph with Calvin Broadus, Jr.
(best known under his stage name, Snoop Dog). When the picture was
posted online, the officer was reprimanded for posing with someone
known to have a criminal history and was formally instructed to refuse to
pose for photographs in the future.3
Arrests, the use of force, and administrative discipline are entirely
unexceptional aspects of modern policing. In the three incidents described above, however, there is an added wrinkle: the officers were not
working for their primary employers at the time. The Eastern Pike Regional Police officer patrolling the pipeline construction site was being
paid by Kinder Morgan, a private energy infrastructure company.4 The
uniformed Metropolitan Police officer patrolling the St. Louis neighborhood was working for Hi-Tech Security, a private security company that
provided the vehicle he was patrolling in at the time.5 The uniformed
Texas Department of Public Safety officer was working for SXSW, Inc.,
which hosts the South-by-Southwest festival.6
Every day, police officers7 across the country don their uniforms,
strap on their gun belts, and head to work. They carry the equipment and
weapons they have been issued. They wear the uniforms and badges that
symbolize their authority. But they are not all reporting to the government agency that employs them. Many officers will instead be using their
authority, training, and equipment on behalf of a private employer, and
they will spend many hours doing so. Indeed, some 300,000 state and local officers may be putting in more than 43.45 million hours of moon2. Fred Barbash & Abby Phillip, Fatal Shooting of 18-Year-Old by Off-Duty Police Officer Ignites Protests in St. Louis, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2014/10/09/crowds-in-streets-of-st-louis-after-fatal-shooting-by-off-duty-police-officer/.
3. Christy Hoppe, DPS Trooper Required to Get Counseling for Posing with Snoop Dogg,
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015, 4:29 PM), http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2015/04/dpstrooper-required-to-get-counseling-for-posing-with-snoop-dogg.html/?hootPostID=e6e9b84abc86957
c270df5491316107a.
4. Kinder Morgan had, according to a letter, contracted with the police department to provide
uniformed officers in marked vehicles so as to “deter protests and prevent delays.” Letter from
Dwayne Jones, Manager, Corp. Sec., Kinder Morgan, to Chad Stewart, Chief of Police, E. Pike Police
Dep’t (May 1, 2013), http://earthisland.org/elist/assets/KM-EPRD.pdf.
5. See infra Part II. Note that this estimate is an extrapolation from a nonrepresentative sample,
so it should not be considered statistically rigorous.
6. Hoppe, supra note 3.
7. I used the terms “police” and “police officer” to refer to law enforcement and law enforcement officers generically. Although there can be both substantive and purely formal distinctions between police departments, sheriffs’ offices, and other agencies, as well as among the various agencies’
employees, those distinctions are not relevant in the context of this Article.
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lighting work in any given year.8 From directing traffic at the exit of a
busy church parking lot to providing security at a packed nightclub, uniformed police officers can, and do, exercise the full panoply of police
powers while working in a private, off-duty capacity. Agencies typically
take a favorable view of moonlighting, permitting, or even encouraging,
officers to accept off-duty employment.9 Not only does it increase police
visibility in the community, it also supplements agency staffing; off-duty
officers will handle situations that would otherwise require an on-duty
officer. Moonlighting benefits officers, who may be paid directly by the
business that employs them, perhaps in cash and at an hourly rate that
exceeds their normal pay.10 Officers may also receive in-kind remuneration, such as free or reduced rent, or other collateral benefits, including
employee discounts.11 But the benefits to agencies and officers are not
without cost. The employment of off-duty officers by private entities
raises serious concerns about democratic legitimacy, legal accountability,
the potential effect on police practices, and the role that law enforcement
agencies play in society.
These concerns are at the core of current and long-standing discussions about policing, but the private employment of public police has
largely evaded the notice of legal scholars,12 sociologists,13 and police and
security professionals.14 This lacuna is all the more surprising given the
robust legal and sociological literature on “private policing” and “plural
policing,” which explores how policing duties are often shared by public
and private entities,15 and the smaller, if equally important, body of work
8.
9.

See infra Part II.
See BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH, MOONLIGHTING: AN OVERVIEW OF POLICIES
GOVERNING PAID POLICE DETAILS 1 (2011), http://www.bgr.org/files/reports/BGR--Police_
Details.pdf.
10. See id.
11. See Jason McGahan, Rent Breaks for Off-Duty Officers, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2001), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2001/02/15/rent-break-for-off-duty-officers/9782ebf3-4aa84108-a038-7c78f1093d65/?utm_term=.7b9bba33d801.
12. David Sklansky offers a rare exception in a paragraph that describes the 150,000 police officers that were estimated to work as private security guards in 1990. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1176 (1998). More recently, Elizabeth Joh raised concerns about the private employment of public police in an op-ed in the Los Angeles Times, noting that the officer who
shot and killed eighteen-year-old Vonderrit Myers, Jr. while patrolling a St. Louis neighborhood was
working for a private security company at the time. Elizabeth E. Joh, When Police Moonlight in Their
Uniforms, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014, 5:38 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-johpolice-moonlighting-vonderrit-myers-20141014-story.html.
13. The late Albert J. Reiss, Jr. was an exception, authoring a study of private employment practices at thirteen different police agencies in the 1980s. ALBERT J. REISS, JR., PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
OF PUBLIC POLICE (1988); see also Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Private Employment of Public Police, in
WILLIAM T. GORMLEY JR., PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 226 (1991) (providing an overview that describes common practices and the competition between private security companies and
public police officers working off-duty security details).
14. The lengthy second volume of the Hallcrest Report, which studied twenty-year trends in the
private security industry and projected those trends for an additional ten years, included all of six pages about the employment of off-duty officers by private security firms, relying both on original surveys
and on Reiss’s work. WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE HALLCREST REPORT II: PRIVATE
SECURITY TRENDS, 1970–2000, at 289–95 (1990).
15. Trevor Jones & Tim Newburn, The United Kingdom, in PLURAL POLICING: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 34 (2006); LORRAINE MAZEROLLE & JANET RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY
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on the interplay of officer self-interest and policing practices.16 The private employment of public police is an important and relevant consideration that has, thus far, gone largely overlooked. This Article begins to
correct that oversight by describing the results of original survey research
of three years of off-duty employment practices at state and local law enforcement agencies across the country—with responses received from
more than 160 agencies that collectively employ more than 143,000 fulltime sworn officers—by exploring the legal and administrative regulations that govern the practice, and by identifying the concerns raised by
off-duty employment.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes private, offduty employment in more detail. I first provide a more complete definition of “private, off-duty employment,” then present the results of an
original survey sent to almost 400 state, city, and county police agencies
across the country. The 162 responding agencies17 employ a collective total of 143,927 full-time, sworn employees, representing almost a fifth of
all state and local officers at general-service law enforcement agencies in
the United States.18 The survey queried agencies on whether they allowed officers to work in a law-enforcement capacity for private employers, their justifications for permitting or prohibiting the practice, and
about the regulations they have adopted to govern off-duty employment.
Agencies that indicated they had a written policy governing private, offduty employment were later asked to provide a copy of that policy. Approximately 80% of responding agencies, employing a collective total of
more than 123,600 full-time, sworn officers, authorize off-duty employment, although their reasons for doing so vary. The remaining roughly
20% of responding agencies, which collectively employ over 20,000 fulltime sworn officers, prohibit off-duty employment, again for a variety of
reasons. Agencies also provided data on the number of officers who were
approved to or who actually worked for private employers, the total
number of hours worked, and the number of moonlighting requests that
the agency declined, although fewer than half of the agencies tracked the
relevant information.

POLICING (2005); Sean James Beaton, Counterparts in Modern Policing: The Influence of Corporate
Investigators on the Public Police and a Call for the Broadening of the State Action Doctrine, 26 TOURO
L. REV. 593 (2010); Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 5736
(2005); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the State, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 357 (2006); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 49
(2004); Hayden P. Smith & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Joint Policing: Third Parties and the Use of Force, 12
POLICE PRAC. & RES. 136 (2011); Cooper J. Strickland, Regulation Without Agency: A Practical Response to Private Policing in United States v. Day, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1338 (2011).
16. See, e.g., EDITH LINN, ARREST DECISIONS: WHAT WORKS FOR THE OFFICER? (2009).
17. The 40% response rate is generally consistent with prior survey research of police agencies.
18. The almost 144,000 full-time, sworn officers employed by the 162 responsive agencies make
up 19.86% of the approximately 724,600 full-time, sworn personnel employed by general service state
and local police agencies in the United States as of 2013. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 2 (2015), http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf [hereinafter REAVES, POLICE DEPARTMENTS].
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Part III examines the state statutes and agency policies that govern
moonlighting. A fifty-state survey identified thirty-four states and the
District of Columbia that have no laws authorizing or governing the private employment of off-duty officers, although officers are likely regulated by more generic statutes regulating government officials’ outside employment. The remaining sixteen states either explicitly authorize
moonlighting (ten) or do so implicitly (six) through statutes that regulate
the practice even though no statute specifically permits it. State statutes
that regulate moonlighting do so by establishing procedural or substantive regulations or by delegating to political subdivisions the authority to
craft such regulations. Other statutes regulate moonlighting by situating
it within a broader legal context by allocating liability for off-duty officers’ actions or by distinguishing between off-duty officers and private security personnel. Despite these thematic similarities, there are substantial
differences in whether and how state laws regulate moonlighting.
Agency policies show even more variation. The survey asked agencies whether they had written policies, procedures, directives, or guidelines for the private employment of off-duty officers and, if so, whether
they would provide their policies if requested. Although the vast majority of agencies indicated that they had a written policy (153) and would be
willing to share it (117), only thirty-eight of the agencies that permit
moonlighting (29.2%) did so when requested. I reviewed the provided
policies and other documents19 with a specific eye to identifying requirements for and restrictions on moonlighting; the administration of private,
off-duty jobs; the use of police uniforms, equipment, and vehicles while
off-duty; and officer remuneration.
Part IV explores the practical, legal, and conceptual concerns raised
by the private employment of off-duty officers. Practically, moonlighting
may affect officers’ decisions and actions, changing their behavior while
both on and off duty. Legally, the private employment of off-duty officers raises questions about the applicability of both civil liability—for officers, police agencies, and private employers—and criminal liability for
the individuals who interact with off-duty officers. Conceptually, moonlighting raises questions about the nature of law enforcement agencies
and the roles they play in the communities they serve. This Article does
not attempt to answer those questions. Instead, my goal is to set the stage
for a much-needed body of work to engage with the normative and prescriptive implications of moonlighting.
I conclude by outlining areas for future research and calling for the
development of best practices to regulate the private employment of offduty officers.

19. For example, some agencies provided copies of the off-duty employment contracts that private employers enter into or similar documentation.
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II. PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY EMPLOYMENT
In this Part, I define the widespread practice of “moonlighting”—
officers working in a law enforcement capacity for private employers
while off-duty. This Part describes off-duty employment practices by relying on an original survey that gathered information from 162 state and
local law enforcement agencies around the country that collectively employ more than 143,000 full-time, sworn officers, almost 20% of all state
and local police officers in the country.
Before turning to the results of my research, it is worth identifying
how little we know about contemporary moonlighting. There has never
been a great deal of information about moonlighting, and the limited
analysis that exists reflects a very different time and social context. It is
an understatement to say that the practice has not been the subject of
sustained academic attention; indeed, it has been almost entirely overlooked since the mid-1980s, when Yale sociologist Albert J. Reiss, Jr.20
examined the practices of thirteen agencies, ranging in size from 288 to
1,829 officers.21 To the extent that moonlighting has been the subject of
study since, it is almost entirely encapsulated in the broader study of the
private security industry. In the late 1980s, the National Institute of Justice, for example, surveyed police executives, corporate security executives, and contract security executives about the private security industry,
including in that topic a brief exploration of moonlighting.22 According to
that study, 81% of police executives indicated that officers were permitted to work in a private security capacity, with the remaining 19% prohibiting or severely restricting the practice.23 The police executives estimated that about 20% of their officers had “regular outside security
employment,” leading researchers to estimate at the time that “at least
150,000 local law-enforcement officers in the U.S. are regularly engaged
in off-duty employment in private security.”24 The researchers further estimated, based on several field studies, that if the officers were each
working fifteen hours per week and getting paid fifteen dollars per
hour—which the study identified as “the low end of the off-duty pay
range”—the total annual earnings of police for off-duty employment
would be about $1.8 billion, or roughly equal to the combined total revenue of the four largest security companies in the country in 1988.25 The

20. Among policing scholars, Reiss is perhaps best known for his ground-breaking observational
studies of officer activity, including police violence and officer misconduct.
21. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
22. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 289–95. The section that discusses the private employment of off-duty officers makes up six pages of the 326-page report, excluding the bibliography.
This second Hallcrest Report built on an earlier report, released in 1985. WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM &
TODD H. TAYLOR, THE HALLCREST REPORT: PRIVATE SECURITY & POLICE IN AMERICA 283–87
(1985).
23. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 290.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 295.
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brief section of the report that discussed moonlighting observed that “the
practice [was] growing.”26
A.

Defining Private, Off-Duty Employment

In this Article,27 I use the terms “moonlighting” and “private, offduty employment” to refer to public police officers working in a law enforcement capacity for private employers outside of their normal working hours in exchange for some financial benefit derived from that private entity. For example, uniformed officers may be paid for providing
security at a nightclub or bar or for directing traffic outside of a church or
synagogue.28 Officers may also receive free or discounted rent at an
apartment complex (so-called “courtesy officers”) in exchange for parking their marked police vehicle in a visible spot or for responding, when
off-duty, to non-emergency calls like noise complaints.29 Officers may be
compensated directly by the private entity that hires them, or the employer may pay the city or agency so the officer’s compensation is channeled through the public payroll system.30 Officers may also receive collateral benefits from private employers, such as employee discounts and
earlier-than-public access to information and products.31
For purposes of this project, “private, off-duty employment” specifically excludes officers who have outside jobs unrelated to law enforcement. An officer who owns a landscaping business, works as an insurance
adjustor, or does freelance photography is not engaged in private, offduty employment as I use that term. The term also excludes officers who
work, while off duty, in a law enforcement capacity when their compensation derives from a governmental entity rather than a private entity.
Thus, officers who work overtime, in uniform and on their day off, at
road construction sites or at collegiate sports events are not engaged in
private, off-duty employment, even if the Department of Roads or the

26. Id.
27. I include this disclaimer because there is no universally accepted industry language that refers to the concept I label “private, off-duty employment.” Law enforcement agencies and organizations use a variety of terms—such as “off-duty employment,” “secondary employment,” “special details,” “extra duty,” and so on—that may or may not, depending on the individual agency, refer to
what I describe as “private, off-duty employment.”
28. See Jon Vanderlaan, Texas City Bans Off-Duty Cops from Working Bars, POLICEONE (Aug.
24, 2016), https://www.policeone.com/financial-planning/articles/213471006-Texas-city-bans-off-dutycops-from-woring-bars/.
29. LAWRENCE J. FENNELLY, HANDBOOK OF LOSS PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION 459
(2012).
30. Kristyn Martin et al., Cops for Hire, AL JAZEERA AM. (Apr. 27, 2015, 2:23 PM), http://
america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/real-money-with-alivelshi/articles/2015/4/27/pay-money-and-hireoff-duty-cops.html.
31. See Desiree Stennett, OPD Officers Paid Well Above Normal Pay to Work ‘Extra Duty’
Security Details at Local Businesses, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 15, 2015, 5:53 PM), http://www.
orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-orlando-police-off-duty-work-20150715-story.html.
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public university hosting the sporting event reimburses the agency or
pays the officers directly.32
Many individuals employed in public service may perform work for
private parties, but the employment of off-duty police officers is unique.
Other officials—traffic engineers, building inspectors, and law professors,
for example—are privately employed because of their knowledge or
skills. To the extent that their public position is valuable to the private
employer, it is because of the symbolic importance of their public position, not because they will be exercising their public powers on behalf of
their private employer. Consider the example of a law professor working
for a state school: the professor may be engaged as a consultant to advise
on litigation strategy, retained to offer an expert opinion, or hired as a
lecturer by a test preparation company. In each case, the private employer benefits from the very attributes that qualify the professor for her public position—her knowledge of the law, her subject-matter expertise, and
her ability to teach effectively. Her public position is important because
it is a strong signal—both to the private employer and to the audience
the private employer wants to impress—of the professor’s qualifications.
In other words, litigation advice, an expert opinion, or exam preparation
information may be perceived as more authoritative because it is provided by a professor. But the value, while very real, is purely symbolic. The
fact that the professor works at a public school does not qualify her to offer opinions or take actions that would be beyond the ken of a similarly
situated consultant, expert, or instructor who works for a private university or outside of higher education altogether. In other words, the professor’s position does not in and of itself instill her with additional
knowledge, skills, or abilities, and the professor is certainly not hired to
exercise her authority as a professor. As with the traffic engineer or
building inspector, being hired by a private employer to use her public
authority—to include or exclude information in a particular course or to
grade exams a certain way, for example—would raise at least the appearance of impropriety. In short, the professor’s public position may bolster
her appeal and gravitas, but it does not itself allow her to say or do anything that she could not say or do in the absence of public employment.
That is decidedly not the case for the privately employed, off-duty
police officer. Like the professor, officers will use the training and skills
that qualify them for their public positions. But, unlike the professor, the
officer can use her public authority on behalf of her private employer.
Indeed, the officer’s greater capacity to detain, search, arrest, and use
force—which may be predicated on a higher quantum of proof than a
private security guard can act upon, but is not tied to a limited set of of33
fenses like merchant’s privilege or an employer’s property —is a large
32. An officer would be engaged in private, off-duty employment for working a sporting event if
their pay originated from a private entity such as a sports franchise, stadium ownership or management, or a booster organization.
33. Seth W. Stoughton, The Blurred Blue Line: Reform in an Era of Public & Private Policing,
___ AM. CRIM. L. REV. ___, 16-25 (forthcoming 2017).
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part of the reason that private employers hire off-duty officers rather
than armed security guards.34 As with the examples at the beginning of
this Article, the actions that off-duty officers take while working for private employers can be indistinguishable from the actions that an on-duty
officer might take. In contrast with other public officials who may also
work for private employers, a public police officer is hired primarily because of her ability to take the same types of action on behalf of her private employer that she can take on behalf of the public: detaining,
searching, and arresting, for example. Where the professor’s title symbolizes her expertise and gravitas, an officer’s title and uniform symbolize
her legal authority.
To further demonstrate the contrast between police officers and
other public sector workers, consider the private employment prospects
of retired public officials. A retired law professor retains her gravitas and
expertise and can thus expect to remain attractive as a consultant, expert,
or lecturer long after leaving her professorship. A retired police officer,
on the other hand, is no longer vested with public authority. While she
might hope to be hired as a consultant or expert based on the knowledge,
skills, and experiences she developed as an officer, she will never again
be hired to provide law enforcement services to a private employer.
B.

Survey Results

To obtain information about contemporary moonlighting, I sent
surveys to almost 400 state and local (city and county) police agencies
representing forty-two states and the District of Columbia.35 Agencies
were selected for inclusion in a nonprobabilistic sample based in part on
the availability of contact information, with a conscious preference for
larger agencies and those representing a variety of geographic locations.36
The mailings were addressed to the head of the agency—e.g., sheriff or
police chief—and included a two-page letter that defined private, offduty employment37 and a three-page survey about the agency’s private,
off-duty employment practices. The surveys could be returned in hard
copy (by use of a stamped, self-addressed envelope included in the mailing) or scanned and returned via e-mail. The letter also explained that
respondents could complete an electronic version of the survey on
Google Forms—which used identical language and was formatted to re34. Phoenix-based security firm Law Enforcement Specialists, which specializes in placing offduty police officers with private employers, lists the comparative benefits of hiring off-duty officers
over “ordinary security guards” on its website, focusing not just on the officers’ greater training and
weaponry, but also on their legal authority, their ability to take action—including the use of deadly
force, when warranted—immediately and decisively. See Why Choose Off Duty Law Enforcement
Over Security Guards?, LAW ENF’T SPECIALISTS, http://offdutypoliceofficers.com/ (last visited Aug. 21,
2017).
35. Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Utah were
not included. Their exclusion was unintentional, not deliberate.
36. The preference for larger agencies was based on the hypothesis that such agencies would be
more likely to track the data requested by the survey.
37. See supra Section II.A.
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semble the hard-copy survey as much as possible—in lieu of filling out
the hard-copy survey. The original survey requests were mailed out in
February 2015. Agencies that did not respond by May 2015 were contacted and asked to complete and return the survey. The surveys solicited
information about the agencies, about the legal and administrative regulation of private, off-duty employment, and about the private, off-duty
employment practices at the agencies. A copy of the survey as it was
mailed out in hard copy appears in Appendix A.38 A copy of the electronic version of the survey can be accessed online.39
A total of 162 state and local police agencies responded to the survey.40 The responding agencies collectively employ 143,927 full-time,
sworn officers, or just under 20% of the more than 720,000 state and local officers in the United States.41 Chart 1 details the responsive agencies
and the number of full-time, sworn officers they employ, categorizing
agencies into seven size ranges that are generally consistent with the categories used by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.42

38. See infra App. A.
39. Seth W. Stoughton, Private, Off-Duty Employment Research Form (2015), https://docs.
google.com/forms/d/1t0Fkqzn2GgnANheVurESe1cLGuD6U2kv9BYQBzYS748/viewform?fbzx=6067
124011061185137.
40. Chart 1 provides a breakdown of the responding agencies by agency size, relying on the selfreported number of full-time, sworn employees and organized into the categories used by the Bureau
of Justice Statistics. See infra App. A. Fifty-four agencies completed the electronic version of the survey, and 101 filled out the hardcopy of the survey. In reporting the results of the survey, I do not further distinguish between agencies that returned a hand-written survey and those that filled out the
electronic version of the survey.
41. REAVES, POLICE DEPARTMENTS, supra note 18, at 2.
42. The relevant categories include agencies that employ over 1,000 officers, 500 to 999 officers,
250–499 officers, 100–249 officers, 50–99 officers, 25–49 officers, and 1–24 officers. The Bureau of Justice Statistics separates the smallest of the categories used in this project (1–24 officers) into four categories: agencies that employ 10–24 officers, 5–9 officers, 2–4 officers, and only a single officer. Id. at 3.
These categories were combined into the 1–24 officers for administrative convenience. Of the eleven
responding agencies that employed 1–24 full-time officers, seven had from 10–24 officers, two had
from 5–9 officers, and two had 2–4 officers.
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CHART 1: RESPONSIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES & NUMBER OF
SWORN OFFICERS
Agency Size by Number of Full-Time, Sworn Employees
All

>1000

999-500

499-250

249-100

99-50

49-25

<25

Total
Agencies

162

40

24

23

29

22

13

11

Full-Time
Sworn
Officers

143,927

111,947

16,733

8,280

4,846

1,513

473

135

Part-Time
Sworn
Officers

1,017

276

296

180

64

46

113

42

Of the 162 responding agencies, 130 agencies (80.25%) permit at
least some form of private, off-duty employment.43 The remaining 32
(19.75%) prohibit officers from working in a law enforcement capacity
for private employers while off duty.44 This finding is consistent with findings from research conducted in the 1980s.45 A majority of agencies in
each size category permitted at least some form of private, off-duty employment, ranging from a high of 95.83% (23 out of 24) of the agencies
that employed 500–999 full-time officers to a low of 65.21% (15 out of
23) of the agencies that employed 250–499 full-time officers. Chart 2 provides a breakdown of permissive and prohibitive agencies.

43. This is very similar to the information obtained by the Hallcrest study of the private security
industry. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
44. Several agencies that checked the box indicating that they did not permit private, off-duty
employment clarified, in their free-form responses, that they do permit some form, often a restricted
form, of private, off-duty employment. For example, one agency indicated that it did not permit private, off-duty employment, but then explained:
We do allow Officers to work for private organizations directing traffic in uniform outside of their
40-hour work week. These outside details may or may not be for a government agency. That being said, all details are arranged through the police department. Money from the agency that hires
the Officer goes to the PD and then the PD pays the Officer. Those details include sporting
events, proms, traffic details for the City or for utility companies, as well as many more. We do
not allow Officers to work jobs that are not scheduled through our PD.
Survey Response by Northampton Police Department, submitted electronically on March 27, 2015.
For the statistics reported in this article, I have categorized such responses as permitting private, offduty employment.
45. See supra notes 13–14, 22–26, and accompanying text.
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CHART 2: AGENCIES THAT PERMIT OR PROHIBIT PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY
EMPLOYMENT

Agencies were asked to briefly explain why they permitted or prohibited private, off-duty employment and were given a space on the survey form to provide free-form answers that could include multiple justifications from a single agency. Before reporting the results, it is important
to acknowledge the limitations of the responses: the answers, after all,
were provided by individual employees who may not have been privy to
or involved in the decision to permit or prohibit moonlighting. Although
it would be a mistake to take the accuracy and authority of any particular
response for granted, the collective responses provide general insights
into the considerations that may motivate policy decisions in this area.
This may be particularly true when the same justifications are provided
by multiple agencies. Among the thirty-two agencies that prohibit the
practice (“prohibitive agencies”), three justifications were repeated in
multiple answers: concerns about liability, conflicts of interest, and governing laws or codes. Additionally, eight justifications were offered by
individual agencies but not reported by multiple agencies.46 Ten agencies
either provided no response or provided a nonresponsive answer. Chart
3 provides a breakdown of the justifications for prohibiting moonlighting.47

46. Those individual reasons include: “[Officers] are trained w/public dollars not to be used for
private entity”; “workman’s comp”; “affecting on duty status”; “prohibited by union contract”; “it
would not be fair [for businesses to get police services because they can pay for them while other businesses do not because they cannot pay for them]”; “[i]t is not a commonly accepted practice in Alaska
[the state in which the agency is located]”; and the availability of overtime through the department.
47. Note that column totals may be greater than 100% because agencies were permitted to provide more than one justification.
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CHART 3: AGENCIES PROHIBITING PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY
EMPLOYMENT – JUSTIFICATIONS

Among the 130 agencies that permit officers to work for private
employers while off duty (“permissive agencies”), seven justifications
were repeated by multiple agencies:
1. Forty agencies identified benefits to community relations;
2. Thirty-six agencies identified benefits to officers, either financial
benefits (thirty-two) or unspecified benefits (four);
3. Thirty-three agencies identified benefits to agency staffing;
4. Twenty-five agencies cited some authority that allowed or required the agency to permit moonlighting, including collective
bargaining agreements (five), agency policy or practice (six),48 or
state law (four);
5. Eighteen agencies identified the increased presence or visibility of
police in the community;
6. Eleven agencies identified benefits to public safety; and
7. Four agencies cited public demand.
Individual agencies also provided four additional justifications, none of
which were reported by more than a single agency.49 Note that a single
agency could provide multiple justifications, all of which were counted
48. There is, of course, a tautological issue with the six agencies that justified permitting private,
off-duty employment by stating that the practice is allowed by agency policy. I include those justifications in an effort to report survey results comprehensively and accurately, although that answer is arguably not responsive to the question asked.
49. Those individual reasons include: “Officers are only allowed to work off-duty when there is a
direct benefit to the University”; “[g]ood for . . . officer engagement”; “[t]o reduce calls for service
saving tax payer fees for service”; and “improve enforcement and coordination between private security and department.”
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separately—thus, twenty-nine of the thirty-four agencies with over 1,000
full-time, sworn officers provided a total of fifty-one justifications, while
the remaining five either did not respond to that survey question or provided a nonresponsive answer. Twenty-seven agencies provided either no
response or an entirely nonresponsive answer. A breakdown of the justifications for prohibiting private, off-duty employment is found in Chart
4.
CHART 4: AGENCIES PERMITTING PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY
EMPLOYMENT–JUSTIFICATIONS

The 130 permissive agencies were asked to provide information
about private, off-duty employment for 2012, 2013, and 2014, including
the number of sworn officers who were approved to work for private
employers, the number of sworn officers who actually worked for private
employers, and the total number of hours sworn officers worked for pri-
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vate employers. For each question, more than half of the responding
agencies either reported that they do not track the relevant information
or they did not provide any information: 30.76% of agencies tracked the
number of officers approved to work for private employers, 46.15%
tracked the number of officers who actually worked for private employers, and 23.84% tracked the number of hours that officers worked for
private employers. In each case, agencies that had at least 1,000 officers
were more likely to track the requested information than most of the
smaller categories. A breakdown of the responses can be found in Charts
5, 6, and 7.50 Additionally, although this is not reflected on the charts,
more agencies reported tracking data in 2014 than in 2012.
CHART 5: NUMBER OF OFFICERS APPROVED FOR OFF-DUTY
EMPLOYMENT, 2012-2014

50.

Note that responses of “0” were treated as responsive.
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CHART 6: NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO WORKED FOR PRIVATE
EMPLOYERS, 2012-2014

CHART 7: NUMBER OF HOURS OFFICERS WORKED FOR PRIVATE
EMPLOYERS, 2012-2014

Further, among agencies that permit officers to engage in moonlighting, refusing to allow it in a particular instance is relatively rare.
Chart 8 provides data from the 29.23% of agencies that track decisions to
refuse private, off-duty employment requests.
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CHART 8: NUMBER OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT REQUESTED DECLINED,
2012-2014

Although fewer than half of the responding agencies reported tracking private, off-duty employment practices, the information provided by
the minority of agencies that do provides some sense of the scope of the
practice. Far more officers across the country may be working for private
employers than is commonly assumed. The sixty agencies that provided
tracked data indicated that 35,514 of their total 83,316 full-time, sworn
employees, or 42.63%, actually worked in a private, off-duty capacity in
2014.51 This was not intended to be a representational survey, and it
would be difficult to generate reliable numbers given the relative infrequency with which agencies track the data, but an estimate based on that
figure suggests that more than 300,000 state and local officers may be engaged in moonlighting in a given year. Further, they may be doing so
more frequently than previously thought. The twenty-eight agencies that
tracked the number of hours that officers worked for private employers
reported an average of 3.7 million hours from 2012 to 2014, and those
agencies employed an average of 61,486 officers in that time.52 Applying
that ratio to the roughly 725,000 state and local officers at generalpurpose agencies in the United States, officers may spend 43,636,763
hours working for private employers in a given year, the equivalent of
over 20,900 full-time positions.53 These rough estimates—which, again,
should not be taken as statistically rigorous—certainly suggest the need
for better information about moonlighting; its regulation; and the practical, legal, and conceptual questions that it raises.
51. Comparing this figure to the number of officers who were approved to work for private employers in 2014—23,178 out of 62,312—is misleading, as the agencies that provided information about
the number of approvals were not necessarily those that provided data about the number of hours actually worked, and vice versa.
52. The 61,486 average includes officers who did not work for private employers at all. The survey instrument and responses were not fine-grained enough to exclude the officers at responsive agencies who did not work for private employers.
53. This figure was reached by applying the 2,087-hour work year described in federal law.
5 U.S.C. § 5504(b) (2012) (identifying how to calculate hourly pay).
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III. REGULATING PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY EMPLOYMENT
Potentially hundreds of thousands of officers work millions of hours
for private employers every year, yet the rules that govern moonlighting
vary tremendously from state to state and agency to agency. In this Part,
I examine the statutory and agency-level regulations that govern the private employment of off-duty officers. As a threshold matter, the Constitution itself is silent on the practice of moonlighting, although off-duty
officers who work for private employers raise a host of questions that
implicate constitutional concerns. Those questions and concerns are discussed in Part IV. Further, I did not attempt to study the regulation of
moonlighting through city or county ordinances. This Part explores the
scope and variety of existing legal and administrative regulations, setting
the stage for an informed discussion of the concerns raised by moonlighting and best practices for addressing those concerns.
A.

Statutory Regulation

Both policing and private security are regulated by state law, but
there are few statutes dealing explicitly with the private employment of
off-duty officers and fewer yet that provide more than a blanket authorization of the practice. An examination of all fifty states and the District
of Columbia revealed that statutory regulation falls into one of three categories; states that do not prohibit moonlighting, but are otherwise silent
on the issue; states that explicitly authorize moonlighting, but do not
regulate it; and states that permit and regulate moonlighting. No state
categorically prohibits police moonlighting.
1.

Statutory Silence

For thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, I was unable to
find any statutory law directed specifically at the private employment of
off-duty officers.54 These states may, of course, have generalized statutes
that, for example, prohibit private employment when it would impair a
public official in the exercise of their public duties.55 Such statutes may
include police officers under their broad provisions, which tacitly approve of public officials working for private employers when there is no

54. States for which I have not identified any specific statutes include: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5806 (West 2016); D.C. CODE § 1-618.02; FLA. STAT.
§ 112.313 (2016); LA. REV. STAT. § 42:1111 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.342(6) (2016); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 10-6-3 (2016). New York leaves it to the governing body of local political subdivisions to develop standards governing, inter alia, “private employment in conflict with official duties, future employment, and such other standards relating to the conduct of officers and employees as may be
deemed advisable.” N.Y. GEN. MUN. Law § 806 (McKinney 2016).
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conflict of interest, but they say nothing specific about moonlighting itself.56
In these states, the ability of off-duty officers to work for private
employers is often assumed under the rationale that what is not prohibited is permitted, particularly in light of historical precedent. An opinion
letter by the Texas Attorney General provides an example of such logic,
describing the lack of explicit authorization for moonlighting, but noting
“that the practice of permitting outside employment is a long-standing
one, having been recognized by many opinions and decisions of this office, as well as by various Texas courts, and the legislature has never taken any action to prohibit the practice.”57
2.

Statutory Authorization

Other states have statutes that authorize, in some fashion, the private employment of off-duty officers. The authorization can be somewhat backhanded, coming in the form of an exception to a more general
rule that otherwise prohibits government employees from taking outside
employment, especially private employment that involves the use of public authority or equipment. California, for example, prohibits executive
employees from receiving any “emolument, gratuity, or reward,” for official acts,58 a prohibition that was read by the state Supreme Court to preclude the private employment of off-duty officers.59 The legislature
amended the statute, creating a specific exemption to avoid precluding
officers from providing security60 and other services61 on behalf of private
employers. In its current iteration, the statute includes a series of limitations on the ability of local public employees to work for private employers,62 but a different provision of California law makes clear that those
limitations are not a prohibition against moonlighting: “It is not the intent of [the Government Code] to prevent the employment by private
business of a public employee, such as a peace officer, . . . who is off duty
to do work related to and compatible with his regular employment.”63
Iowa, similarly, exempts police officers from a general prohibition that
otherwise forbids public employees from engaging in outside employment
56. This is not to suggest that such laws have no effect on police practices. For a more thorough
discussion, see Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179 (2014)
(describing laws that, while not aimed specifically at policing, still exert a significant effect on police
practices).
57. See Tex. Atty. Gen. Op., No. GA-0256, 2004 WL 2231869, at *3 (Oct. 4, 2004). Texas law
explicitly provides for some officers to accept private employment. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 411.0077–.0078 (West 2016).
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(a) (West 2016).
59. Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Co., 595 P.2d 975, 979 (Cal. 1979), superseded by statute, CAL.
PENAL CODE § 243; People v. Corey 581 P.2d 644, 639 (Cal. 1978), superseded by statute, Cal. Penal
Code § 243, as recognized in Melendez v. City of L.A., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469 (1998).
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(c)(1).
61. Id. § 70(e).
62. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1126(a) (West 2016).
63. Id. § 1127.
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that involves the use of [public] time, facilities, equipment, and supplies or the use of [a public] badge, uniform, business card, or other
evidences of office or employment to give the person . . . an advantage or pecuniary benefit that is not available to other similarly
situated members of . . . the public.64
Some states go beyond not prohibiting the practice by explicitly authorizing it. Kentucky law, for example, allows officers “while in office, and
during hours other than regular or scheduled duty hours” to provide security services as well as engage in “any other similar or private employment.”65 A Washington statute provides clear authorization for state patrol officers, establishing that they “may engage in private law
enforcement off-duty employment, in uniform or in plainclothes for private benefit.”66
It is possible for authorization to be both explicit and tepid: Virginia
allows private, off-duty employment, but it does so by delegating the decision to authorize private, off-duty employment to the political subdivision in which an officer works.67
3.

Statutory Regulation

In addition to authorizing the private employment of off-duty officers, several states have adopted statutes that regulate the practice in
some way. Some statutes directly govern the practice of moonlighting itself by establishing procedural or substantive regulations or by delegating to political subdivisions the authority to craft such regulations. Other
statutes regulate moonlighting by situating it within a legal framework,
by allocating liability for off-duty officers’ actions, or by distinguishing
between off-duty officers and private security personnel.
a. Direct Regulation
The direct regulation of moonlighting comes in the form of statutes
that set out procedural requirements or substantive rules, or which explicitly delegate regulatory authority to localities or police agencies. Although the primary focus here is state statutes, I would be remiss if I
omitted the observation that federal law explicitly contemplates that police officers—as well as firefighters and correctional officers—may engage in moonlighting. It does so by setting out that, for purposes of overtime compensation, the hours that any state or local officer does “special
detail work” by providing “law enforcement[] or related activities” to a
“separate or independent employer” are not added to the hours the officer works for the primary employer.68 For the statute to apply, the of64. IOWA CODE § 68B.2A(1)(a) (2016).
65. KY. RV. STAT. ANN. § 61.310(4) (West 2016).
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.112 (2016). The statute does not address officers who work for
other state or local agencies.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1712 (2016).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 207(p)(1) (2012).
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ficer must choose to engage in the special detail and the agency must either require the officer to be privately employed to work the special detail, facilitate the officer’s private employment, or “otherwise affect[] the
condition of employment . . . by a separate and independent employer.”69
At the state level, the statutes that impose procedural regulations
on the private employment of off-duty officers are directed primarily at
creating a formal approval process. Some states require the head of a police agency to approve private, off-duty employment. Georgia requires
the written approval of the head of the police agency (or a designee) that
employs the officer.70 Washington allows officers to work as security
guards only when approved to do so by the “chief law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction where the employment takes place,” which, in
certain circumstances, could mean the approval of the head of an agency
other than the one the officer works for.71 Other states require some supervisory approval but do not limit it to the head of an agency. Iowa, for
example, requires officers to obtain the approval of the agency but does
not designate who in the agency must provide that approval.72 Similarly,
California allows off-duty officers to work for private employers after being certified as qualified—a term it does not define—by the police agency and receiving “the approval of [the officer’s] agency supervisor,” but it
does not identify what level of supervisor must approve the request.73 Yet
other states require approval outside the police agency. Mississippi requires deputies to have the approval of the county sheriff74 and municipal
employees to get permission from the “governing authority of a municipality”; in both contexts, state law directs the approving authority to consider, in each individual case,75 whether private employment will bring
disrepute or promote the public interest.76
Some states require certain types of approval only for certain types
of private employment. For officers working in a security capacity, California requires the local political body—city council or county board of
supervisors—to approve the “casual or part-time employment as a private security guard or patrolman,”77 and the police agency must approve
the officer’s use of its uniform and equipment.78 The agency’s approval is
essential, as the law requires the officer to wear a police uniform while
working in a security capacity.79 In South Carolina, off-duty officers may
69. Id. § 207(p)(1)(C).
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3(c) (2016).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.020(3) (2016).
72. IOWA CODE § 68B.2A(1)(a) (2016).
73. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1127 (West 2016).
74. County sheriffs are, in many states, constitutional officers that are entirely separate from,
and do not answer to, a county political authority such as a board of governors. Cf. Stoughton, Incidental Regulation, supra note 56, at 2197 n.72.
75. Mississippi law requires that approval must be given individually, rather than established as
blanket authorization. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-11(1).
76. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-11(1)–(2) (2016).
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(d)(1)(B) (West 2016).
78. Id. § 70(d)(1)(C).
79. Id. § 70(d)(1)(A).
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wear their police uniforms, equipment, and weapons while working for a
private employer if they receive the approval of both the agency and the
“governing body” that employs them.80 Florida law imposes specific procedural requirements only in certain cases, requiring written approval of
the agency or department head before officers can provide security services to businesses licensed to sell alcoholic beverages.81
In addition to ex ante approval, procedural regulations may require
the officer or private employer to provide certain information to the police agency. In Mississippi and South Carolina, for example, individual
officers who take private, off-duty jobs must provide their police agency
advance notification of the place and type of employment as well as the
hours to be worked.82 In other states, information may need to be provided to the private employer. In Washington, state patrol officers must
provide written notice of the state’s liability rules to their private employer.83
In addition to procedural requirements, some statutes establish substantive rules. Such statutes typically reflect legislative discomfort with
the use of public authority on behalf of private employers in certain situations, such as labor disputes, or with regard to certain businesses, such
as those that serve alcohol. Off-duty officers in California cannot “exercise the powers of [a] police officer if employed by a private employer as
a security guard during a strike, lockout, picketing, or other physical
demonstration of a labor dispute at the site of the strike, lockout, picketing, or other . . . demonstration.”84 Kentucky goes even further, prohibiting officers from working, “directly or indirectly, in any labor dispute
during [their] off-duty hours.”85 West Virginia law, similarly, states that
officers shall not “engage in off-duty police work for any party engaged
in or involved in [a] labor dispute or trouble between employer and employee.”86 Rhode Island takes an even broader approach by prohibiting
municipalities and all agents, servants, and employees from accepting
from any party to the labor dispute any compensation or reimbursement
for any expense incurred in connection with a labor dispute.87 The law
specifically identifies off-duty officers as municipal employees and explicitly prohibits “[p]rivate security guard services provided by off-duty police officers.”88
With regard to businesses that sell alcohol, New York forbids officers from having any direct or indirect interest in the manufacture or sale
of alcoholic beverages, permitting officers to work for private employers
who sell alcohol only in severely limited circumstances: officers may
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-24-10 (2016).
FLA. STAT. § 561.25(3) (2016).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-11(4) (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-24-50.
See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(d)(2).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.310(4) (West 2016).
W. VA. CODE § 8-14-3 (2016).
28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-10-13.1(a) (2016).
Id. § 28-10-13.1(b).
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“work in a premise licensed to sell beer at retail for off-premises consumption . . . [or] work solely as a security guard or director of traffic on
the premises of a volunteer firefighters’ organization licensed to sell beer
and wine at retail pursuant to a temporary permit for on-premises consumption.”89 According to the State Liquor Authority, this precludes officers not just from working for a business licensed to serve alcohol but
also from working for a security company hired by such a business.90
In addition to regulating the procedure or substance of private, offduty employment, state laws may also delegate regulatory authority. California law gives police agencies the authority to establish “reasonable
rules and regulations” that officers must abide by while working for a
private employer.91 Similarly, Virginia has a statute authorizing localities
to regulate the private employment of off-duty officers by ordinance or,
at the locality’s option, to “delegate the promulgation of . . . reasonable
rules to the [police] chief . . . or sheriff.”92
b. Indirect Regulation
Not all state statutes regulate moonlighting by establishing procedural or substantive rules for the practice itself. Some instead situate the
private employment of off-duty officers into a broader legal context by
allocating liability for officers’ actions or by distinguishing between
moonlighting and the private security industry.
Several states explicitly limit or allocate liability arising from the actions of off-duty officers who are working for private employers. California puts “any and all civil and criminal liability” arising from an off-duty
officer’s actions, even those taken on behalf of a private employer, on the
officer’s principal (public) employer.93 Mississippi takes the opposite
tack, putting liability for an off-duty officer’s actions and omissions solely
on the private employer and insulating the state and any political subdivisions from liability for any actions taken on behalf of the private employer.94 Further, Mississippi explicitly requires private employers to “fully indemnify” police agencies “for any expense or loss, including
attorney’s fees, which results from any action taken against the jurisdiction arising out of the acts or omissions of the officer in discharge of private security services while wearing the official uniform or using the official weapon.”95 Washington has adopted a similar approach with regard
to off-duty state patrol officers; the state specifically disclaims liability for
conduct “that occurs while such officers are engaged in private law en89. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 128-a (McKinney 2016).
90. Michel Lou & Matthew Spina, Molly’s Update: State Law Prohibits Cops from Working for
Bars, BUFFALO NEWS (May 20, 2014), http://www.buffalonews.com/city-region/police-courts/mollysupdate-state-law-prohibits-cops-from-working-for-bars-20140520.
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(d)(1)(D) (West 2016).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1712 (2016).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(d)(2).
94. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-11(3) (2016).
95. Id.
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forcement off-duty employment.”96 State officers are required to provide
written notification of that rule to private employers.97
It is possible to take a less absolute approach. In a statute governing
sheriffs’ offices, Florida apportions liability for an off-duty deputy’s actions to the private employer but sets out explicitly that, for workers’
compensation purposes, an injury that occurs while the off-duty deputy is
“enforcing . . . criminal, traffic, or penal laws” is to be considered an onduty injury.98 It takes a broad view of what constitutes “on-duty,” defining it to include “providing security, patrol, or traffic direction for a private . . . employer.”99
Another approach is to make liability conditional. Alabama requires private employers who hire off-duty officers that “perform any
type of security work or to work while in the uniform of a peace officer”
to maintain $100,000 in liability insurance to indemnify the officer for actions taken “within the line and scope of the private employment.”100 The
failure to maintain insurance that indemnifies the officer renders “every
individual employer, every general partner of a partnership employer,
every member of an unincorporated association employer, and every officer of a corporate employer individually liable” for the off-duty officer’s actions.101
Several states have statutes that seek to distinguish, in some way,
the regulation of off-duty officers from the regulation of the private security industry. Perhaps the most common form of statutory regulation
touching on the private security industry is the exemption of public police officers from the licensure or regulatory requirements that apply to
other security guards and private investigators—off-duty officers may
work in a private security capacity without fulfilling the general requirements that a private security guard would have to satisfy. Texas, for example, exempts from private security regulations any “person who has
full-time employment as a peace officer and who receives compensation
for private employment.”102 Arizona, similarly, allows people to “act or
attempt to act or represent to that [they are] security guard[s]” only if
they are either a registered security guard or “a regularly commissioned
peace officer.”103 Washington takes a similar approach, exempting sworn
officers who are “employed by any person to engage in off-duty employment as a private security guard” from the requirements otherwise
imposed on security guards.104 Florida is similar, exempting off-duty dep-

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.175(1) (2016).
Id. § 4.92.175(3)
FLA. STAT. § 30.2905(b)(2) (2016).
Id.
ALA. CODE § 6-5-338(c) (2016).
Id.
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1702.322(1) (West 2016).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2608(A) (2016).
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.020 (2016).
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uty sheriffs from the licensure requirements that otherwise apply to “persons who watch or guard, patrol services, or private investigators.”105
Driven perhaps by concerns about competition between private security agencies and public police providing private security services106 or
by the potential problems of blurring the line between public police and
the private security industry, some state statutes have attempted to draw
a firm line between the two. In Tennessee, for example, an off-duty officer can work in a security capacity on behalf of a private employer, but
if the private employer is a licensed, contract security company, the officer is prohibited from wearing a police uniform or identifying themselves as a police officer.107 Similarly, officers in North Carolina may not
be licensed as private investigators or security guards,108 and, if an officer
works for a “licensed security guard and patrol company,” the officer is
prohibited from wearing her police uniform or using police equipment.109
As in Tennessee, however, off-duty officers can provide similar services
for other employers, and there is no prohibition on such officers wearing
their police uniforms or using police equipment when they work for private employers other than a licensed security guard and patrol company.110 Some state laws authorize police officers to work in environments
that are closed to the private security industry. In Connecticut, for example, only sworn officers—current or retired—can provide armed security
services in public schools.111
B.

Administrative Regulations

Well over half the states lack any statutory regulation of moonlighting, and the remainder have adopted statutes that, with few exceptions,
provide little governance other than liability allocation or low-level procedural or substantive rules. Consequentially, the regulation of moonlighting is left primarily to law enforcement agencies themselves.
Research into the administrative regulation of moonlighting is limited. Perhaps the broadest review was documented in six pages of the
Hallcrest Report II published in 1990, which examined twenty-year
trends in the private security industry and was published in 1990.112 That
report described, in general terms, different aspects of agency-level regulations. The report stated that agency policy often specified that off-duty
officers had the full authority of on-duty officers, most agencies permitted officers to wear their uniforms, and “many” permitted officers to use

105. FLA. STAT. § 30.2905(3) (2016).
106. See supra Part II.A.
107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-35-127 (2016); Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen., No. 00-166, 2000 WL 1616931
(Oct. 31, 2000). But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-35-141(b)(2).
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-21(a) (2016).
109. Id. § 74C-21(b).
110. Id. § 74C-21(c).
111. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-244a (2016).
112. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 286–87.
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other equipment, “especially radios and police vehicles.”113 It also found
that agencies typically inserted themselves between individual officers
and private employers, keeping off-duty assignments and payments “inhouse,” and requiring liability waivers from both officers and private
employers.114 The Hallcrest Report II also found that many agencies set a
maximum number of hours—“generally 20 hours per week”—that officers could work for private employers.115 More recently, in August 2011,
the Bureau of Governmental Research (“BGR”) released a report on
proposed changes to the New Orleans Police Department’s moonlighting
practices, which were based on problems identified during a Department
of Justice investigation that ultimately resulted in a consent decree.116 For
that report, the BGR reviewed model policies, actual policies at thirty
agencies, and best practices.117 That report identified seven essential elements for strong policies to govern off-duty employment (the report refers to moonlighting jobs as “details”):
Centralized control and administration of all or most aspects of
details[;]
Appropriate limitations on the types of businesses that can hire
officers for details[;]
Eligibility requirements for officers seeking to work details[;]
Limitations on work hours[;]
A process for fairly assigning work and ensuring proper staffing
of details[;]
A fee policy that compensates officers on a standardized basis and
cover[s] related departmental costs[; and]
Monitoring and supervision of details.118
In its 2007 survey of local police departments, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) found that the vast majority of police departments had
written policies governing off-duty employment, although the BJS did
not offer any details about the content of those policies.119
For this Article, the survey instrument I sent asked agencies whether they had written policies, procedures, directives, or guidelines for the
private employment of off-duty officers. The vast majority of agencies
113. Id. at 285.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 286–87.
116. BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH, supra note 9.
117. Id. at 9–10.
118. Id. at 3.
119. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13
(2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf (finding 83% of all local police departments
had off-duty employment policies, ranging from more than 98% of agencies serving populations of
more than 10,000 to 68% of agencies serving populations of less than 2,500). The lack of details makes
it difficult to determine whether the reported policies governed off-duty employment in a law enforcement capacity, which is the focus of this Article, or whether it also includes policies that govern
employment unrelated to law enforcement.
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(153, or 94.4%) indicated that they did, although six (3.7%) indicated
that they did not, and three (1.9%) did not answer the question. Of the
agencies with written policies, most (109, or 71.2%) had been modified in
the last two years, while forty-two (27.5%) had not been, and two agencies (1.3%) did not answer the question. Recent changes to the policies
were generally modest, ranging from semantic changes and minor clarifications to introducing Internet-based resources for managing off-duty
jobs. A few agencies expanded or restricted moonlighting or made
changes to the maximum number of hours officers could work or the pay
scale for off-duty employment. Only one agency, which is now under a
consent decree, described a substantial overhaul of its off-duty employment policy, which was the result of a consent decree.
The survey also asked whether agencies would provide their policies
if requested.120 Of the 153 agencies with written policies, only 117
(76.4%) stated that they would be willing to provide a copy. Twentythree agencies (15%) stated that they would not do so, and sixteen agencies (10.5%) did not answer the question. A few agencies provided their
policies at the time they sent in their survey responses. The remaining
agencies that indicated they were willing to provide a copy of their
moonlighting policies were later asked to do so. Relatively few responded. I received and reviewed policies from thirty-eight agencies (29.23%
of the 130 agencies that permit moonlighting) that employ a total of
36,848 full-time sworn officers, which are broken into size categories in
Chart 9.
CHART 9: AGENCIES PROVIDING OFF-DUTY EMPLOYMENT
POLICIES

I reviewed the provided policies and other documents121 with a specific eye to identifying requirements for and restrictions on moonlighting;
the administration of private, off-duty jobs; the use of police uniforms,
equipment, and vehicles while off duty; and officer remuneration. As
with any policy analysis, review was complicated by the inconsistent use
of terminology between agencies122 and the differing level of specificity in
120. I intentionally did not request a copy of the policy with the survey instrument, as I was concerned that doing so might have had a chilling effect on agencies’ willingness to complete the survey
itself.
121. For example, some agencies provided copies of the off-duty employment contracts that private employers enter into or similar documentation.
122. What this Article calls “private, off-duty employment,” for example, agencies call “extra duty,” “secondary employment,” “outside employment,” and a variety of other terms.
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agency documentation.123 Further, it is important to keep in mind that
agency policies can be complicated and overlapping: for example, an
agency’s vehicle policy may regulate the off-duty use of vehicles, its leave
policy may regulate moonlighting while on leave, and its off-duty employment policy may regulate both the off-duty use of vehicles and
moonlighting while on leave. Obtaining a full understanding of how a
particular agency regulates different aspects of moonlighting requires a
comprehensive review of all applicable policies, but doing so was outside
the scope of my research for this Article. Given those realities and the
relatively small number of policies, this Section is more properly read as
an illustration of different regulatory approaches than as a representative
of industry norms.
1.

Requirements & Restrictions for Moonlighting

Agency policies establish a variety of restrictions and requirements
that officers, private employers, or both must meet before an officer is
permitted to accept moonlighting work. Twenty-five of the thirty-eight
policies (65.8%) regulate when in their careers officers can begin moonlighting, as, for example, by prohibiting off-duty officers from working
for private employers during the police academy (fifteen policies), or
field training (eleven policies), or a probationary period124 following field
training (eight policies). Several policies were more nuanced, allowing
officers to work off duty in some capacities but not others at certain
points. One agency, for example, generally permits officers to engage in
moonlighting once they have finished field training and are in a probationary period, but prohibits them from moonlighting for private businesses that serve alcohol. At that agency, only officers who have completed the probationary period can moonlight at private businesses that
serves alcohol. Similarly, some agencies permit officers to accept positions as “courtesy officers”—receiving reduced rent at an apartment
building or complex—during the probationary period. Other agencies
prohibit it. Sometimes a policy is nuanced by exceptions, as with policies
that generally prohibit probationary officers from accepting off-duty employment but allow it in the case of officers who have recently worked at
another police agency.
Officers who have fully completed training and a probationary period are not freed of all restrictions, of course. A few policies prohibit officers who have been assigned to specialized units, like vice or narcotics,
from engaging in moonlighting. Twenty-seven policies (71.1%) address
123. Some policies were fairly comprehensive, while other policies were limited to a single page.
Understanding several policies required going beyond the policy itself to other agency documentation.
124. The duration of the probationary period varies from agency to agency. The policies reviewed
for this project suggest a range from six to eighteen months, but when exactly that clock starts can differ. Some agencies start the probationary clock after an officer completes basic recruit training (at a
police academy) while others start the clock only when an officer is sworn in or completes field training.
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officers who are on a limited, light, or restricted duty assignment.125 Most
of the policies prohibit officers from moonlighting when they are on anything other than regular duty, although a few allow for off-duty work if it
is consistent with the restrictions that prevent the officer from working a
regular-duty assignment. Nine policies (23.7%) require an officer to be in
good standing or otherwise take into account an officer’s disciplinary
record or present job performance.
Another common, though hardly universal, aspect of off-duty employment policies addresses officers moonlighting while on leave. Twenty-six policies (68.4%) prohibit or restrict an officer from moonlighting
while they are on leave for medical reasons, and some policies prohibit
officers from doing so within a certain amount of time (typically eight or
twenty-four hours) of returning from sick leave. Twenty-three policies
(60.1%) address disciplinary leave, prohibiting officers from working for
private employers while they are suspended from regular duty. Other
policies prohibit moonlighting while officers are on other types of leave,
including bereavement leave, Family and Medical Leave Act leave,
workers compensation leave, military leave, and so on. Interestingly,
most of the policies explicitly or implicitly allow officers to engage in
moonlighting while taking personal (vacation) leave or compensatory
time.126
Even when officers are allowed to engage in moonlighting, agency
policy may regulate the schedule or number of hours an officer can work.
Ten policies (26.3%) prohibit officers from moonlighting for a period of
time immediately before (up to eight hours) or after (up to thirty
minutes) their regular shift. Nineteen policies (50%) limit the total number of hours that officers can work, both on duty and off duty, in a specific period, although there is little consistency in what that total can be:
maximums ranged from fourteen to eighteen hours in a day and from sixty-four to 112 hours in a week. Additionally, thirteen policies (34.2%) restrict the number of purely off-duty hours that an officer may work in a
given period. Here, figures ranged from five to sixteen hours per day,
from twenty to thirty-six hours per week, and from forty to seventy-two
hours per month. The most detailed policy came from an agency with between twenty-five and fifty full-time officers; it limited moonlighting to
no more than five hours on officers’ regular duty days, no more than seven hours on the last work day of the week, and no more than twelve
125. As opposed to a “regular duty assignment,” which indicates that the officer is physically and
psychologically capable of conducting the full range of police functions, a limited, light, or restricted
duty assignment is typically used to accommodate medical or other limitations. For example, an officer
who was injured may be placed on light duty until a doctor clears the individual to return to regular
duty.
126. Compensatory time gives officers time off for working beyond their normal duty assignment
in a given period. Thus, an officer who is regularly scheduled to work a forty-hour week on patrol, but
who actually works fifty hours may take or be given ten hours of compensatory leave rather than pay
(or fifty hours, at time-and-a-half, rather than overtime pay). At some agencies, officers can choose to
take compensatory leave in lieu of pay. At other agencies, officers may be required to take one or the
other in certain circumstances.
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hours on officers’ days off. Policies that limit the total number of hours
that officers can work function as a de facto “time off” requirement, but a
few policies were more explicit, requiring officers to get adequate rest or
specifying a minimum amount of rest time that officers must have between shifts.
Officers may also be prohibited from working for certain types of
employers or from engaging in certain types of work. Such policies seem
to be motivated by some combination of the desire to avoid confusing
the public nature of an officer’s law enforcement duties (as with policies
that prohibit officers from working as bill collectors), the desire to maintain moral authority (as with policies that prohibit officers from working
for sexually oriented businesses), and the desire to minimize or mitigate
the risk of liability. The single most common restriction related to the
type of employer involves businesses that serve alcohol: thirty-two of the
thirty-eight policies (84.2%) prohibit or restrict moonlighting at such establishments. Restrictions range from prohibiting the officer from serving or selling alcohol, to requiring multiple officers, to prohibiting officers from physically working inside an establishment, limiting them to
working at the entrance or in the parking lot. Other alcohol-related restrictions include limiting the nature of an off-duty officer’s role: several
policies explicitly state that officers are only to fulfill law enforcement
duties, not serve as bouncers or provide other services.
As with alcohol-related businesses, officers may be prohibited from
or restricted in working for: sexually oriented businesses (eighteen policies, 47.4%), tow-truck companies (sixteen policies, 42.1%), criminal enterprises or businesses owned by criminals (twelve policies, 31.6%),
gambling establishments (nine policies, 23.7%), political employers
(eight policies, 21.1%), public utility companies (two policies, or 5.3%),
and racist organizations (two policies, or 5.3%). Additionally, sixteen
policies (42.1%) prohibit or restrict officers from working for businesses
in the midst of a strike or labor-management dispute. Notably, ten policies (26.3%) prohibit officers from working for private attorneys or restrict them from assisting with criminal defense work.
Various policies also prohibit officers from working in certain capacities, regardless of the nature of the private employer. Twenty-eight
policies (73.7%) prohibit or restrict officers from working as private investigators, bounty hunters, or officers in another jurisdiction, and fourteen policies (36.8%) prohibit or restrict officers from working as bodyguards or bouncers. Twenty-four policies (63.4%) prohibit or restrict
officers from working as bill collectors or bondsmen. Officers are also
prohibited or restricted from working as repossession agents (seventeen
policies, 44.7%); process servers (eleven policies, 28.9%); in jobs involving investigative techniques such as performing polygraphs, crash reconstruction, or background checks (ten policies, 26.3%); and as couriers of
cash or valuables (six policies, 16.7%).

STOUGHTON (DO NOT DELETE)

1878

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

10/3/2017 10:37 AM

[Vol. 2017

Other restrictions on the type of private employer or nature of work
include insurance companies, taxi companies, junk yards, businesses under investigation, businesses that require officers to sign indemnity
agreements, businesses that compete with private security firms, locksmiths, raves, dance halls, billiard parlors, and employers that the agency
has put onto a blacklist.
2.

Off-Duty Employment Administration

There was substantial variation in how law enforcement agencies
administered private, off-duty employment programs and who in the
agency had the authority to approve or decline a moonlighting request.
Twenty agencies (52.6%) employ an in-house, off-duty employment coordinator. The coordinators’ positions are split almost equally between a
purely administrative role (with no authority to approve or disapprove
requests) and a supervisory approach that includes evaluating and authorizing moonlighting requests. Whether administrative or supervisory,
internal coordinators appear to do little or no negotiation with the private employer; they may review and implement an off-duty work schedule, but they do not work with the private employer to create the schedule. One policy took a different approach, allowing private employers to
hire an officer as a coordinator—a coordinator for the specific private
employer or job, rather than a coordinator for the police agency. As an
external coordinator, that officer would work with the private employer
to develop a schedule, negotiate pay rates, hire other officers for off-duty
work, and so on. Such a coordinator may be paid an hourly rate by the
private employer or receive a percentage of the total paid to other officers who work off-duty for that employer.127
The survey solicited information about the lowest-ranking supervisor who could approve a request for private, off-duty employment.
Agencies largely fell into two categories: forty-eight agencies reported
requiring the approval of either the agency head (thirty-four) or assistant
or deputy agency head (fourteen), while thirty-nine agencies reported
requiring the approval of a front-line supervisor such as a sergeant
(twenty-six) or lieutenant (thirteen). Relatively few agencies required
approval by a captain (three), major (four), colonel (two), or commander
(seven).128 Thirteen agencies that reported permitting private, off-duty
employment also reported that they did not require any supervisory approval. Four agencies that permit moonlighting did not respond to this
question. Several agencies indicated that supervisory approval depended
on the employee who would be working off-duty; officers required the
approval of a front-line supervisor, while higher-ranked employees re127. Brendan McCarthy, Biggest Earners in New Orleans Police Details are Often High-Ranking
Officers Overseeing the Jobs, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 16, 2011, 6:08 AM), http://www.nola.com/
crime/index.ssf/2011/05/post_271.html.
128. Importantly, not all police agencies have all of those ranks, and some agencies may have different ranks that the survey did not account for.
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quired higher-level approval. The survey also solicited information on
the role of discretion in refusing moonlighting requests. Of the 130 agencies that permit moonlighting, 105 (80.8%) indicated that supervisors retained discretion to refuse moonlighting requests even if those requests
complied with all written policy criteria. Seventeen agencies (13.1%) require supervisors to approve such requests, while eight agencies (6.2%)
did not respond to that question.
Of the thirty-eight agencies that provided policies for review, twenty-three policies (60.5%) identified the lowest-ranking supervisor who
can decline a moonlighting request. Although some policies explicitly
state that only high-level commanders can refuse a request, most allow
the immediate supervisor to do so. Separately, twenty-nine policies
(76.3%) identified the highest-ranking supervisor who must approve
such requests, with the vast majority requiring the approval of the agency
head (police chief or sheriff).
3.

Uniforms, Equipment, and Vehicles

Many agency policies governed, to some extent, what public equipment an officer can wear or use while moonlighting. Twenty agencies
(52.6%) require officers to wear their uniforms129 while working off duty
for private employers, although nine policies allowed exceptions when
authorized by a supervisor—exactly what level supervisor varied, from
lieutenant to agency head, but no policies allowed sergeants to exempt
officers from the uniform requirement. Five agencies (13.2%) had policies that permitted, but did not appear to require, officers to wear a uniform while moonlighting. Five agencies (13.2%) had policies that did not
discuss uniforms.
Similarly, twenty-one policies (55.3%) either require officers to carry their issued weapons and other equipment with them while moonlighting or permit them to do so with supervisory approval. As a general matter, officers are typically expected to carry their firearm and secondary
weapons whenever they are in uniform. One policy specifically allows officers to use other agency equipment beyond what is personally issued to
the officers—such as traffic cones or extra flashlights—so long as that
equipment is not needed by an on-duty officer. None of the policies I reviewed discussed body-worn cameras (commonly referred to as “body
cams”), although an analysis by the Associated Press found that only five
of the twenty largest police agencies require uniformed officers to wear
130
body cams while off-duty. Several agencies, on the other hand, specifi-

129. A full review of what type of uniform agencies require, permit, or prohibit is outside the
scope of this Article. One agency, for example, required officers to wear at least a “Class B” uniform
while moonlighting.
130. Moonlighting Police Leave Body Cameras at Home, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 11, 2017,
http://www.wctv.tv/content/news/Moonlighting-police-leave-body-cameras-at-home-427813483.html.
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cally do not require moonlighting officers to wear body cams even when
131
they do require on-duty officers to wear them.
There was slightly more variation with regard to officers’ use of police vehicles for private, off-duty employment. Eighteen policies (47.4%)
allow officers to use a police vehicle while moonlighting, although some
require special approval (eight policies, 21.1%) or impose a fee on the
officer or the private employer (five policies, 13.2%). Four policies
(10.5%) prohibit the use of police vehicles for moonlighting jobs.
4.

Officer Remuneration

Of the thirty-eight agencies that provided documentation, a substantial majority (twenty-seven, or 71.1%) require the private employer
to pay the officer directly. Two agencies prohibit direct cash payments,
but allow direct payments by check or other means. One agency requires
officers to report to the agency all compensation received. Ten agencies
(26.3%) appear to require private employers to pay the agency itself,
which then pays the officer. One agency allows private employers to either pay the officer directly or to channel compensation through the
agency. Six agencies that receive payments from private employers include in their policies an administrative fee; most of the policies do not
identify exactly how much that fee is, but the ones that do range from
two dollars per hour per officer to five dollars per hour per officer. At
least one agency charges the officer an administrative fee—fifty dollars
per month for use of an agency vehicle.
There was similar variation in the way policies regulate the pay officers receive for private, off-duty employment. Seventeen policies
(44.7%) do not mention pay scale at all. Fifteen agencies (39.5%) have
either a fixed pay rate or a pay schedule that private employers must
abide by. Five agencies (13.2%) set a minimum pay rate but allow for
negotiation above that amount. The minimum pay rate may be scaled to
a particular dollar amount (e.g., one agency set a twenty-five dollar minimum) or to some other referent (one agency set the minimum at the
hourly rate of a rookie officer). Several agencies have policies that set a
minimum number of hours for which officers must be paid, separate and
apart from the minimum hourly pay. No agency policy establishes a negotiable pay scale with an hourly maximum.
IV. MOONLIGHTING CONCERNS AND CONSIDERATIONS
Where Part III discussed the statutory and administrative regimes
that govern the private employment of off-duty officers, this Part explores the considerations that should underlie regulatory decisionmaking. Specifically, I seek to identify the practical, legal, and conceptual
concerns about the effects of moonlighting on the officers themselves,
131.

Id.
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the agencies they work for, and the communities they serve. Understanding the potential effects of moonlighting is a necessary prerequisite to
evaluating the way the practice is regulated and to developing industry
best practices.
A.

Practical Considerations

Moonlighting may affect the overall quality of police services by either compensating for or contributing to low pay. Given limited municipal and county budgets, pay scales that are often set by the terms of collective-bargaining agreements, and benefits packages governed by
collective bargaining or state law, police agencies may be unable to offer
flexible, competitive salaries. By permitting moonlighting, such agencies
may be able to attract applicants by offering the potential for a higher income than the agency itself could provide. In such cases, private employers—or, more accurately, the possibility of private employment—may
supplement what the agency itself provides, expanding the agency’s applicant pool by appealing to candidates with desirable educational or
professional backgrounds who might otherwise be inclined to accept a
higher paying position with a different agency or pursue an entirely different career field. In that way, agencies that permit moonlighting may
improve the quality of police services by allowing them to hire more or
better officers than they could otherwise afford. On the other hand, the
potential for individual officers to supplement their income through private employment might reduce the salary that police agencies must offer
to attract candidates. In that way, moonlighting may drive wages down,
perhaps decreasing the overall quality of police services. Low pay may
create a gap that moonlighting can fill, but it may also be true that moonlighting contributes to low pay in the first place.
Moonlighting may also affect officers’ actions and decision-making.
Off-duty officers who are working for a private employer may interact
with the public and take actions that deviate from the actions that an onduty officer might take in any given scenario. After all, officers are not
drones that mindlessly carry out departmental priorities; they are affected by self-interest and are susceptible to conflict. Off-duty officers retain
law enforcement powers, but they are working at the pleasure of a private employer who, implicitly or explicitly, may prefer that off-duty officers exercise their discretion in a way that benefits the business’ interests without regard to the police mission. Off-duty officers may be more
likely to ignore or merely disrupt suspicious activity that they would have
investigated had they been on duty, and they may be less likely to engage
in enforcement actions against a private business’ customers for low-level
civil infractions and criminal offenses. For example, an off-duty officer
working for a private employer might ignore parking or traffic violations
or tell intoxicated nightclub patrons to leave for the evening rather than
arresting them for disorderly conduct or public drunkenness. Officers
may also find themselves enforcing private employers’ rules or exercising
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discretion on behalf of a private employer in problematic ways, such as
enforcing an employer’s dress code when that dress code is facially neutral but has a clear racially discriminatory effect.132
An officer’s on-duty behavior can also be shaped by off-duty employment. For example, an officer approaching the end of her shift may
be reluctant to do anything that would delay her arrival at a moonlighting job, especially when the employer provides an hourly rate of pay that
exceeds the officer’s normal duty pay.133 Even when an officer is not an
employee of a private venue, her on-duty behavior may be affected if her
friends and coworkers are employed there, and even more so if the officer is interested in working there in the future.
Whether on or off duty, an officer’s decisions and actions may be affected by some conflict between the police agency’s interests, the private
employer’s interests, and the officer’s own personal interests. That was
certainly the perception of some police executives who participated in
the Hallcrest Report II, which reflected their concerns about “the use or
misuse of authority or police records for personal or financial gain,
and . . . the provision of selected services that are normally part of an officer’s publicly paid responsibilities.”134 Police executives thought these
concerns were exacerbated when officers contracted with private employers directly or through a police union and mitigated when private
employers had to go through the agency to hire off-duty officers.135 Concerns may also be exacerbated when a large portion of officers’ income is
derived from private employment; in some cases, officers make more
from moonlighting than they do from their public employment.136 Even
when that is not the case, officers may change their behavior if private
employment becomes particularly valuable. Consider that an officer’s retirement is often an average of a certain number of their highest-earning
years; an officer’s retirement benefits, for example, may be 3% (per year
of service) of the three highest-paid years in the officer’s career. If pay
for off-duty work is channeled through the agency, and if it counts as officer pay for retirement purposes,137 then officers near retirement (when
they are already at the top of their pay range) may have a strong incentive to inflate their highest-paid years by working a large number of
hours for private employers.
Beyond conscious decision-making, officer behavior can also be affected by fatigue. According to research by the Police Foundation, the
132. See, e.g., Jessica Dickerson, Minneapolis Restaurant, ‘Bar Louie,’ Sparks Outrage with ‘Jim
Crow’ Dress Code, HUFFINGTON POST (July 7, 2014, 4:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/07/07/bar-louie-racist-dress-code_n_5564530.html; Chris Gray et al., Getting Past the Bouncer,
HOUS. PRESS (Feb. 9, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.houstonpress.com/news/getting-past-the-bouncer6587799.
133. Cf. LINN, supra note 16.
134. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 286.
135. Id.
136. McCarthy, supra note 127.
137. This survey did not inquire as to whether pay for private, off-duty employment was counted
toward retirement.
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length of an officer’s shift can affect judgment and behavior; shifts of
eight and ten hours do not appear to have any negative affect, but shifts
longer than ten hours do.138 Officers who engage in moonlighting either
immediately before or immediately after their regular shifts are effectively extending their working hours, quite possibly beyond the point at
which fatigue begins to take some toll. Recall that of the thirty-eight policies that agencies provided, only half limited the number of hours that
officers could work in a given period, and none of those had a limit of
less than fourteen hours in a single day. An officer who works for a private employer on one of their regular days off might not hit that threshold, but that does not free officers from the potential threat of fatigue.
Research on circadian rhythms and differential shift work suggests that
fatigue may be a problem. For example, an officer who works a regular
daytime shift is more likely to be affected by fatigue if they work an offduty night shift for a club that closes in the early morning, even if the officer’s on-duty and off-duty work are on different days.139 This may be
why off-duty employment has been positively correlated with the likelihood of an on-duty vehicle crash.140 Moonlighting is not the only source
of fatigue, of course—an officer who played video games late into the
previous night may be just as tired as an officer who was working at a
bar—but agency-approved moonlighting represents an officially sanctioned activity in a way that purely personal entertainment does not.
Off-duty employment also has the potential to shape officers’ perceptions in both positive and negative ways by reinforcing or moderating
officers’ implicit biases. Officers, like everyone else, hold implicit biases
that color, at an unconscious level, their interpretation of the world
around them. Implicit biases may relate to race, ethnicity, age, apparent
social status, religion, and a range of other characteristics. It is those implicit biases that can lead officers to, for example, perceive a group of
black teens as more suspicious than a group of white teens, think of Hispanic parties as more boisterous and wild than white parties, question a
Muslim person’s motivations more closely than a Christian person’s, or
find an affluent white woman’s account of events more credible than a
working-class black man’s account. Psychological research strongly suggests that implicit racial bias, occurring as it does at a completely unconscious level, creates substantial challenges for modern policing.141 And
138. KAREN L. AMENDOLA ET AL., POLICE FOUND., THE SHIFT LENGTH EXPERIMENT: WHAT
WE KNOW ABOUT 8-, 10-, AND 12-HOUR SHIFTS IN POLICING 37 (2011), http://www.policefoundation.
org/publication/shift-length-experiment/.
139. See id. at 22–23.
140. Bryan Vila, Sleep Deprivation: What Does It Mean for Public Safety Officers? 262 NAT’L
INST. JUST. J. 26, 28 (2009); Bryan Vila & Dennis Jay Kennedy, Tired Cops: The Prevalence and Potential Consequences of Police Fatigue, 248 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 16, 19 (2002); see also J. Andrew Hansen,
Explaining Law Enforcement Officer-Involved Vehicle Collisions and Other Police Behavior (2015)
(unpublished dissertation, University of South Carolina) (on file with author) (“It is . . . possible that
second jobs are indicative of financial strain due to family illness, spousal unemployment, or some
other stressful situation that may contribute to fatigue.”).
141. Tracey G. Gove, Implicit Bias and Law Enforcement, POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 2011, at 44, 45,
http://fairandimpartialpolicing.com/docs/thepolicechief.pdf.
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moonlighting may play a role in creating or addressing those challenges.
When an officer observes behavior that is consistent with an existing stereotype—that, say, people of a certain ethnicity are loud and disruptive
or are unable to consume alcohol responsibly—that observation can reinforce the stereotype, strengthening the officer’s implicit bias. The implications are obvious, at least with regard to certain types of off-duty employment; officers who provide security at or outside of a nightclub on
Latin Night or Hip-Hop Night might have their biases invisibly but
meaningfully reinforced to the detriment of the officer’s future interactions with community members. On the other hand, the literature suggests that implicit biases may be tempered by exposure that challenges
the stereotype.142 An officer who, for example, works security at a grocery store in a black neighborhood may have a series of positive interactions that reduces the potency of her racial biases.
Finally, moonlighting also has the potential to negatively affect the
balance of power within police agencies. When individual officers work
as coordinators for private employers—selecting other officers to work
off duty, creating schedules, distributing pay, et cetera—they also gain a
disruptive measure of social capital within the police agency itself. For
example, a review of the New Orleans Police Department (prior to its
consent decree) found that off-duty jobs were, in some cases, “coordinated by lower-ranking officers who have their supervisors on the detail
payroll.”143 Such an arrangement wreaks havoc in a hierarchical command structure; a supervisor cannot simultaneously manage an employee
and rely on that employee for a job.
B.

Legal Considerations

The law grants police officers special authority to, inter alia, detain,
arrest, and use force. It imposes special requirements on the exercise of
that authority, recognizing the need to balance the exercise of state power against individual interests. And it creates remedial mechanisms that
attempt to strike a balance between limiting governmental overreach and
chilling essential government actions. But do those laws apply with full
force to off-duty officers? In this Section, I explore the legal issues raised
by the private employment of off-duty officers. The threshold question,
of course, is whether officers can exercise police powers while working
off-duty. Current practice and the overwhelming weight of existing legal
authority suggest that an officer is vested with authority by virtue of her
position as an officer, not by virtue of her status as on or off duty.144 Officers can therefore exercise police authority regardless of whether they

142. Id. at 49.
143. McCarthy, supra note 127.
144. Sawyer v. Humphries, 570 A.2d 341, 345–47 (Md. App. Ct. 1990) (discussing decisions from
New York, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Ohio, and Minnesota); SYDNEY H.
ASCH, POLICE AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 35 (1968).
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are working a normal shift or moonlighting.145 Other questions are less
easily answered, and what answers exist are inconsistent and confusing.
1.

Reported Litigation

The survey instrument queried whether agencies had been subject
to litigation relating to private, off-duty employment. Twenty-one of the
162 agencies (13%) reported that they had, 120 agencies (74.1%) indicated that they had not, and twenty-one agencies (13%) did not answer
the question. Agencies that indicated there had been litigation were
asked to briefly describe it. Of those twenty-one agencies, six reported
litigation related to the use of force by off-duty officers, including one
shooting; four reported litigation related to vehicle crashes involving or
allegedly caused by an off-duty officer; three reported litigation related
to contractual disputes involving a private employer’s refusal to pay; one
reported litigation involving an arrest; and one reported litigation involving an alleged failure to protect. The remaining agencies either provided
no description or a nonresponsive answer.
2.

Officer Liability

As public officials, police officers are subject to constitutional constraints, violations of which can expose them to civil liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against anyone who violates constitutional rights while acting under color of state law.146 The
Court has adopted a broad reading of “under color of” state law, holding
that, in the civil context as in the criminal context,147 it refers to the exercise of authority “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”148 A
public official, in other words, acts under color of law by acting under
“pretense of law.”149
To determine whether a police officer was clothed with the authority of state law at a particular time, courts have referred to a variety of ad
hoc factors but have not developed a formalized test. This should not be
surprising; the vast majority of § 1983 cases likely result from actions
taken by on duty officers working their regular shifts or assignments, and
thus the question of whether an officer was acting under color of law may
145. An officer’s authority may be limited by geographic jurisdiction, however. Stoughton, Incidental Regulation, supra note 56, at 2198 (“State laws generally recognize the local nature of policing
by restricting officers’ extraterritorial authority.”).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]
147. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
148. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941)).
149. Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 987 (1st Cir. 1995).
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be taken for granted. But what about when an officer was off duty at the
time? Whether an officer is on or off duty is a relevant factor,150 of
course, but simply being off duty does not preclude an officer from using—or misusing—her authority.151 As a result, courts have had to sift
through fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiries to determine whether officers, though off duty, were still clothed with the authority of state law. Courts have framed the test in different ways. The “key
determinant” for the First Circuit is “whether the actor . . . purposes to
act in an official capacity or to exercise official responsibilities.”152 The
Fifth Circuit looks to whether there was a sufficient “nexus between the
victim, the improper conduct, and [the officer’s] performance of official
duties.”153 The Seventh Circuit focuses on “whether [the officer’s] actions
related in some way to the performance of a police duty.”154 Regardless
of how exactly the test is framed, judicial inquiries generally focus on two
loosely connected concepts: the apparent status of the officer as an officer and the nature of the officer’s actions.155
Courts have indicated that an officer’s apparent status—specifically
whether the officer looked like an officer at the time—is highly relevant
to determining if the officer was acting under color of state law.156 Courts
have recited a range of relevant factors, including whether the officer
identified herself as an officer;157 whether other parties were aware of the
officer’s official identity;158 whether the officer was in uniform159 or dis150. Hechavarria v. San Francisco, 463 Fed. App’x 632, 633 (9th Cir. 2011); Greco v. Guss, 775
F.2d 161, 168 (7th Cir. 1985).
151. See, e.g., Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Whether an officer
is acting under color of state law does not depend on his on-or off-duty status at the time of the alleged
violation.”); Pickrel v. Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Deciding whether a police officer acted under color of state law should turn largely on the nature of the specific acts the police officer performed, rather than on merely whether he was actively assigned at the moment to the performance of police duties.”); Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994) (“More is required than a
simple determination as to whether an officer was on or off duty when the challenged incident occurred.”); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other
grounds and remanded for reconsideration by City of Lawton, Okla. v. Lusby, 474 U.S. 805 (1985);
Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir.
1975).
152. Martinez, 54 F.3d at 986.
153. Bustos, 599 F.3d at 464–65.
154. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1517 (7th Cir. 1990).
155. In perhaps the most concise and coherent judicial description of the two concepts, the First
Circuit has stated: “Even though ‘acting under color of law’ includes ‘acting under pretense of law’ for
purposes of a state action analysis, there can be no pretense if the challenged conduct is not related in
some meaningful way either to the officer’s governmental status or to the performance of his duties.”
Martinez, 54 F.3d at 987.
156. Claudio v. Sawyer, 409 Fed. App’x 464, 466 (2d Cir. 2011).
157. Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489, 496 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 (2007); Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 835 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc);
Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003); Rivera v. La Porte, 896 F.2d 691, 696 (2d Cir.
1990); Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980); Wahhab v. City of N.Y., 386 F. Supp. 2d
277, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
158. Wahhab, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
159. Hechavarria v. San Fransisco, 463 Fed. App’x 632, 633 (9th Cir. 2011); Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at
496, abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 (2007); Pickrel v. Springfield, 45 F.3d
1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 1995); Hanson v. Larkin, 605 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (D. Minn. 1985) (holding that an
officer was acting under color of law because he was in uniform at the time).
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played a badge or official identification;160 whether the officer possessed
or used police equipment such as a police vehicle,161 handcuffs,162 a firearm,163 or other weaponry164 or equipment;165 and whether the actions under review occurred on police property.166
Courts have also indicated that the nature of the officer’s actions is
a core consideration in determining whether she was acting under color
of state law.167 Here, too, courts have described a variety of different factors, including whether the officer detained,168 arrested, ejected,169 or
questioned someone; whether the officer was engaged in a “traditional
public safety function”;170 and whether the officer’s “primary duty” at the
time was to the public police agency or the private employer.171 Of particular relevance in the context of private, off-duty employment is the nature of the private employment relationship and the way that relationship shapes the officer’s actions. When a private employer hires a police
officer explicitly “to intervene in cases requiring police action,”172 for example, the officer’s actions may be more readily identifiable as taken under color of state law.173
The various factors that different courts have used and the weight
that courts have put on those factors show little in the way of consistency.
While some courts have held that a single factor—the fact that an officer
160. Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 496, abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384
(2007); Jocks, 316 F.3d at 134; Pickrel, 45 F.3d at 1118; Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423,
1429 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds and remanded for reconsideration by City of Lawton,
Okla. v. Lusby, 474 U.S. 805 (1985); Traver, 627 F.2d at 938; Brandon v. Allen, 516 F. Supp. 1355, 1360
(W.D. Tenn. 1981), rev’d on other grounds by, Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151 (6th. Cir. 1983).
161. Hechavarria, 463 Fed. App’x at 633; Pickrel, 45 F.3d at 1118.
162. Rivera, 896 F.2d at 696.
163. Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 835 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Jocks, 316 F.3d at 134;
Pickrel, 45 F.3d at 1118; Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994); Rivera, 896 F.2d at 696 (revolver); Brandon, 516 F. Supp. at 1360, rev’d on other grounds by Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151 (6th.
Cir. 1983).
164. Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 496, abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384
(2007); Wahhab v. New York, 386 F. Supp. 2d 277, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
165. Hechavarria, 463 Fed. App’x at 633; Haines v. Fisher, 82 F.3d 1503, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that officers who, as a practical joke, staged a fake robbery of a convenience store were not
acting under color of law even though they used various pieces of police property).
166. Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a police chief was not
acting under color of state law when he assaulted a family member at the police department).
167. Pickrel, 45 F.3d at 1118 (“Deciding whether a police officer acted under color of state law
should turn largely on the nature of the specific acts the police officer performed.”).
168. Chapman, 319 F.3d at 835 (en banc).
169. Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 495–96, abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384
(2007).
170. Wahhab v. New York, 386 F. Supp. 2d 277, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). This factor, of course, requires identifying what exactly traditional public safety functions are. Again, there is no clear answer.
For example, does working in a security and crowd-control capacity at a musical event constitute a
traditional public safety function? At least one state appellate court has answered in the negative. See
Pardon v. Finkel, 540 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
171. Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980).
172. Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 496–97 (internal quotation marks omitted) (officer hired to work security at a sporting event), abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 (2007).
173. Id. at 495–97; Traver, 627 F.2d at 938 (holding that off-duty officer working for a bank was
acting under color of state law in part because he responded “as a police officer rather than as a bank
employee”).
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was in uniform at the time174—was enough to establish that the officer
was acting under color of state law, other courts have held that the same
factor was all but irrelevant.175 Courts generally resist basing their determination on any single factor,176 but they are often confused about how
much weight to give the many factors they recite. As a result, courts have
sometimes emphasized the need to focus on the nature of the officer’s
actions while at the same time discussing factors more closely related to
an officer’s appearance than the nature of their actions.177 Further, there
is often tension within and between different factors. At the same time
that some courts have held the exercise of traditional police authority,
such as detaining or arresting a suspected criminal, supports the conclusion that an off-duty officer is clothed with the authority of state law,
other courts have held that “the performance of private security functions [that] may entail the investigation of a crime does not transform the
actions of a private security officer into state action,” even when the private security officer is an uniformed, off-duty police officer.178
The characterization of an officer—as a public official, private employee, both, or neither—determines not only whether the officer is potentially subject to constitutional tort litigation under § 1983, but also
what defenses the officer can use to defend themselves against state or
constitutional tort claims.
Statutory law that waives sovereign immunity from tort liability
generally withholds that waiver—thus preserving immunity—in various
contexts applicable to police actions.179 One of the primary exceptions to
the waiver of immunity involves the exercise of discretion by government
agents in the course of their official duties.180 Such an exception exists in
the Federal Torts Claims Act, which exempts from the waiver of sovereign immunity “[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . .
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”181 State law often es174. Hanson v. Larkin, 605 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (D. Minn. 1985); see also Jocks v. Tavernier, 316
F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We have no doubt that when an officer identifies himself as a police officer and uses his service pistol, he acts under color of law.”).
175. Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d
438, 440–41 (6th Cir. 1975)) (stating that it is “the nature of the act performed, not the clothing of the
actor” that determines whether an officer was acting under color of law).
176. Id.; Gibson v. City of Chic., 910 F.2d 1510, 1516 (7th Cir. 1990).
177. Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 495–96 (explaining that the correct focus is on the nature of the actions
but relying heavily on the officer’s appearance), abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549
U.S. 384 (2007); Pickrel v. Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 1995).
178. Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 834 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Sanchez v. Crump, 184
F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
179. Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutions: The Right Ticket for Some Torts, TRIAL, Dec. 1, 1997, at
38 (“Often state immunity laws, as well as their common law counterparts, are threaded with exceptions to liability for discretionary acts, intentional torts, law enforcement activities, and so forth, any of
which could defeat recovery for a constitutional rights claim.”).
180. See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
467 U.S. 797, 810 (1984); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648–49 (1980) (describing the
separation-of-powers concerns that underlie immunity for discretionary actions).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012); see also Mark C. Niles, “Nothing but Mischief”: The Federal Tort
Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1301–35 (2002).
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tablishes an analog,182 and “[a] majority of courts . . . apply the ‘discretionary function’ test when considering the duties of state and local governmental entities.”183 In the private, off-duty employment context, an
officer may be shielded from liability for harms relating to discretionary
decisions to detain, to arrest, to investigate, or to use force, but only if
such a decision was an exercise of official power. If the decision to detain
or arrest was an exercise of private power—the type exercised by citizens
or merchants and their employees—then governmental immunity does
not apply. The Michigan Court of Appeals, for example, held that governmental immunity did not apply to off-duty deputies who were sued—
for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and
battery, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress—following an
altercation at a musical venue for which they were providing security.184
Relying on the police agency’s contract with the concert promoter, in
which the promoter agreed to pay the county a set hourly rate for each
off-duty deputy, the court held that the deputies were engaged in “a private security guard situation, . . . a nongovernmental function, thereby
precluding the [official] immunity defense.”185
In addition to official immunity, off-duty officers benefit from
common-law defenses when acting in their official capacity. The existence of probable cause, for example, is a complete defense that officers
can raise against claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution.186 In some states, any employee of a private merchant may
receive similar protection under a “shopkeeper’s privilege” law, rendering inconsequential the question of whether an off-duty officer was acting as an officer or as a merchant’s employee. In states that provide more
protection to officers than private employees, however, the distinction
can be critical.
As critical as it is, however, the results of the distinction may not be
theoretically sound. When an officer takes action that is functionally
identical to the actions that are—or would have been—taken by a private
employee or security guard, it is not clear whether anything other than
pure formalism justifies exposing the officer to additional liability under
§ 1983 or providing additional protections under various police-specific
defenses. Consider, for example, qualified immunity, “the most important doctrine in the law of constitutional torts.”187 Qualified immunity
insulates public officials, including police officers, from constitutional
tort suits unless it was clear at the time that their actions violated an es182. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §50-21-24(2) (2016); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.265(3)(c) (2016); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(5) (2016).
183. W. Jonathan Cardi, The Role of Negligence Duty Analysis in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1129, 1155 (2014) (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 270, at 720–21
(2000)).
184. Pardon v. Finkel, 540 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851,
860 (2010).
187. Id. at 852.
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tablished constitutional right.188 That is to say, if a reasonable officer
could have believed that the actions in question were lawful, qualified
immunity shields the officer not just from damages, but from suit.189 Such
protection is necessary, the Court has said, to avoid the many costs of
frivolous claims, such as
the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from
pressing public issues, . . . the deterrence of able bodied citizens
from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that
fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the more resolute, or more irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.190
When an officer’s actions, taken on duty and solely on behalf of the public, give rise to a § 1983 claim, the justifications for qualified immunity’s
expansive protections are at least arguably appropriate. But when an offduty officer acts on behalf of a private employer, the defense is less tethered to its rationales. The officer will face the expenses of litigation and
the diversion of their attention from official duties, but that would be
true in a real estate dispute or any other private suit completely unrelated to the officer’s public authority, from a real estate suit to divorce litigation.191 As for deterrence, while the courts are appropriately cautious
about the risk of driving people away from public employment or chilling
public employees in the exercise of their duties, the same need for restraint is not self-evident in the context of the private employment of offduty officers. Applying qualified immunity in the context of moonlighting suggests that the unflinching discharge of an officer’s duties necessarily involves working for a private employer. Indeed, there may be reasons to encourage police officers to weigh carefully the potential risks of
accepting off-duty work or to dampen their ardor for using public authority on behalf of private employers.
3.

Municipal Liability

Though the Court has rejected respondeat superior in the context of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipalities may be liable for constitutional deprivations that result from an official custom or policy.192 For example, a city
may be liable when its police agency fails to train or supervise its officers
when the lack of training or supervision “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”193
188. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
189. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
190. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. An officer engaged in real estate litigation arguably faces more expense, given the high rates
at which officers are indemnified from the costs of job-related litigation. See Joanna Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014). It may also be true that purely private litigation may
divert an officer’s attention away from pressing public issues more than litigation related to an officer’s
official actions, given the important but under-studied role that purely private factors play in official
decision making. LINN, supra note 16 at 29–30.
192. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
193. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
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But identifying the requisite level of supervision or training in the moonlighting context may prove difficult. During their regular-duty assignments, officers work within a chain of command with clearly delineated
authority: every sergeant, lieutenant, and captain knows whom they are
responsible for and when. Officers may be pulled out of their regular duties and given a special assignment, but there, too, the supervisory hierarchy is quite clear: officers are temporarily under the supervision of a
different part of the chain of command. Who, then, supervises the offduty officer? Perhaps there is a centralized supervisor who exercises control over all of the agency’s off-duty officers at a given time, or perhaps
off-duty officers report to whichever supervisors are on-duty and responsible for the jurisdiction where the private employer is working, or perhaps off-duty officers are under the authority of their regular supervisor
(who is, of course, not working at the time). More troublingly, if likely
more frequently, perhaps officers turn paperwork into police supervisors,
but they report to and work under the day-to-day direction of a private
employer.
Similar questions arise in the context of failure-to-train claims. Officers undoubtedly use their police training on behalf of private employers, but the question is whether officers go beyond that training and, if
so, whether the municipalities have an obligation to provide additional
training. For example, officers may commonly deal with noise complaints, but an officer who, while off duty, handles such complaints at a
local apartment complex in exchange for reduced rent—a so-called
“courtesy officer”—is far more likely to deal with landlord/tenant disputes, code violations, nuisance abatement issues, and the like. Similarly,
officers who moonlight for retail businesses are more likely than their
on-duty colleagues to deal with labor and employment issues. Failing to
provide officers with guidance on such issues may arguably amount to
deliberate indifference to civilians’ rights. Additionally, the extent to
which municipalities and police agencies can rely on a private employer
to provide relevant training remains an unanswered question.
What evidence might tend to establish or disprove an alleged failure
to train or supervise off-duty officers? In litigation that reached the Seventh Circuit, one plaintiff argued that a city’s indemnification agreement
with the private employer—under which the private employer was liable
for any judgments against the city—established that the city was aware
that off-duty officers engage in constitutional violations.194 Though the
argument was unsuccessful in that case, it illustrates how policies and
procedures that regulate moonlighting may be central to the issue of liability.
State law further complicates the picture. Under state tort law, a police agency’s vicarious liability depends on whether the officer was acting
within the scope of her employment. As with the “under color of law”
inquiry, a range of factors may be considered, and courts may well weigh
194.

Robles v. Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d 732, 736–37 (7th Cir. 1997).
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those factors very differently. An appellate court in Louisiana, for example, held that merely wearing a police uniform not only fails to establish
that the officer was acting within the course and scope of their employment, it does not even create a genuine issue of material fact on that
question.195
4.

Private Employer Liability

Private parties can be liable for constitutional violations under §
1983, though they must be acting as a government agent for such liability
to attach. In the context of private businesses employing off-duty officers, the Fifth Circuit has held that a private employer acts under color of
state law when they have formed a pre-arranged or customary plan with
the police. In Smith v. Brookshire Brothers, the Fifth Circuit found that
the Lufkin, Texas Police Department had a practice of arresting or ejecting individuals at the request of retail store employees without “independently establishing that there was probable cause . . . without a valid
complaint having been filed and without knowing the facts to believe
that a crime had been committed.”196 This practice, the court held, was
sufficient to establish that the retail store was acting under color of law
for purposes of § 1983 liability.197 Different courts have articulated similar
concepts, though in different contexts. The Seventh Circuit has held that
a private party acts under color of law by conspiring with a public official
to effect a constitutional deprivation,198 while the Tenth Circuit has held a
police officer’s delegation to a private actor of the duty to independently
investigate and make an independent probable-cause determination is
sufficient to establish that the private party was acting under color of
law.199 In the context of off-duty employment, a police agency’s policies
and procedures—particularly those that give the private employer some
form of supervisory authority over officers—may advance the argument
that the private employer was a state actor.
More common than § 1983 liability, however, is the potential for a
private employer to be subject to respondeat superior liability for the tortious actions of its employees. As a matter of blackletter law, employers
are not vicariously liable for actions committed by an independent contractor, and there is a substantial literature on making that distinction. I
raise it here only to note that the finding that an officer is acting under
color of law does not necessarily rule out the finding that the officer was
also an employee of a private business. Under the “dual master doctrine,” an officer’s off-duty work might establish them as an employee of
both the government and the private employer. In White v. Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc., for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Luccia v. Cummings, 646 So.2d 1142, 1144 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
519 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id.
Greco v. Guss, 775 F.2d 161, 168 (7th Cir. 1985).
Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1258–59 (10th Cir. 1998).
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held that a government agency could be held liable for the actions of an
officer who was off duty and privately employed at the time if the officer’s actions involved the exercise of a traditional police power, the
municipality had actual or constructive knowledge of the officer’s actions, the officer’s actions served the interests of both the private employer and the municipality, and the interests of the private employer
and the municipality were not inconsistent with each other.200
5.

Criminal Liability

Civil liability, of course, is only part of the puzzle. There is also the
potential of criminal liability—which may be imposed on civilians who
interact with the off-duty officer—to consider. Crimes, particularly violent crimes, are punished more severely when they are committed against
officers. Does that include off-duty officers? If a nightclub patron shoves
an off-duty officer who is working for the club at the time, or if an
apartment complex visitor runs away from the courtesy officer, can the
civilian be arrested for, charged with, and convicted of battery on a law
enforcement officer or resisting a law enforcement officer? Here, as with
the “under color of law” question under § 1983, the distinction between
public officer and private employee is critical.
In 1979, the California Supreme Court held that, in the context of
an off-duty officer working for a private employer, “the fact of private
employment . . . operates to prevent a police officer from acting in what
would otherwise be his official capacity.”201 Because the officer was not
acting in an official capacity, he could not be the victim of crime predicated on that official identity, such as battery of an officer. The California legislature rejected the state supreme court’s decision, legislating that
the battery of an officer was an aggravated offense regardless of whether
the officer was on or off duty or working in a private capacity.202
Other states have adopted a more nuanced approach. A decision
from the North Carolina Supreme Court, for example, held that, in the
context of capital-punishment aggravating circumstances, “a police officer retains his official law enforcement officer status even while ‘off duty’ unless it is clear from the nature of his activities that he is acting solely
on behalf of a private entity, or is engaged in some frolic or private business of his own.”203 Shortly thereafter, a state appellate court applied that
holding to a defendant who had struck two off-duty officers while they
were working, in uniform, for a fast-food restaurant. As the court explained:
[The officers] were working in full police uniform and were carrying
sidearms. [T]he officers’ [off-duty] employment had been arranged
200.
201.
ted).
202.
203.

33 S.W.3d 713, 725 (Tenn. 2000).
Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Co., 595 P.2d 975, 980 (Cal. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitCAL. PENAL CODE § 243(b) (West 2016).
State v. Gaines, 421 S.E.2d 569, 575 (N.C. 1992).
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through the Charlotte Police Department and the officers were required to follow Department mandated rules and guidelines. Furthermore, at the time they were assaulted, Officers Henry and Ferguson were attempting to place defendant under arrest. Making
arrests is one of the official duties of law-enforcement officers.
It is not clear whether it was the appearance of the officers, their actions,
or both that were the operative facts, but the court upheld the conviction
under a statute that provided it was a misdemeanor to “[a]ssault[] a lawenforcement officer, . . . while the officer . . . is discharging or attempting
to discharge a duty of his office.”204
C.

Conceptual Considerations

Beyond the practical and legal concerns are the conceptual concerns
to which moonlighting gives rise. One such concern is the role and function law enforcement agencies fulfill. Traditionally, police agencies are
thought to prioritize public service; maintenance of order; and the prevention, investigation, and resolution of criminal behavior, each of which
advances a clear community interest. As recent attention to civil asset
forfeiture and the Department of Justice’s report on the Ferguson Police
Department make clear, police agencies sometimes engage in an additional function—revenue generation. The private employment of officers
can be used to increase officer income, generate agency revenue, or
both.205 Indeed, reviewing the answers to the survey instrument, one sees
that supplementing officer income was the third most popular justification that agencies offered for permitting private employers to hire offduty officers.206 Although it was outside the scope of this research, the
Hallcrest Report II’s survey of security industry professionals found that
“20% of [private] security managers reported receiving ‘informal bids’
from law enforcement agencies and about 30% from individual police officers.”207 Instead of overseeing officers as they respond to calls for service or proactively seeking to improve quality of life in the communities
they serve, such an approach threatens to recast police agencies as hiring
halls, challenging the view of police organizations as exclusively or primarily public-service agencies.
Further, police agencies that permit or encourage moonlighting may
put themselves in a position of choosing, or at least affecting the selection of, winners and losers in the private commercial sector. Of the agencies that permit moonlighting, supervisors at 105 of the 130 agencies
(80.8%) retain discretion to refuse moonlighting requests even if those
requests comply with all written policy criteria. There is, of course, the
potential for discretion to be exercised for a range of inappropriate reasons. There is also, however, the potential for the exercise of discretion
204.
205.
206.
207.

State v. Lightner, 423 S.E.2d 827, 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
At least at agencies that take a cut of what they charge private employers for officers’ time.
See supra Chart 3.
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 292.
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to have far-reaching effects. Consider two nightclubs, identical except for
a police executive’s decision to allow off-duty officers to work at one, but
not the other. As a result, off-duty officers handle most of the incidents
at one club, but problems at the second require an on-duty officer to be
dispatched, meaning that a dispatch record is maintained and more reports and arrests are generated. Over the course of a year or more, the
first night club maintains a stellar record with few, if any, formally recorded problems, but the second night club develops a lengthy paper trail
documenting numerous incidents and problems. That documentation, or
lack thereof, can affect zoning and licensing decisions at the state and local level, such as the renewal of an alcohol sales license. Crime bulletins
carried in the local newspaper can affect a business’ reputation. That, in
turn, can affect its patronage, raising the specter of a negative feedback
loop that could result in increasing problems—a venue that becomes
known for trouble attracts troublemakers. If this seems far-fetched, consider that one large agency (with well over 1,000 officers) that reported
litigation related to the private employment of off-duty officers indicated
that it stopped providing officers when a private employer did not pay
for services. The agency’s explanation continued, “[p]rivate employer
lost liquor lic[ense] because of lack of off-duty employment.” Admittedly, of course, my more expansive example is a hypothetical; I use it to illustrate how police agencies’ discretionary decisions about private, offduty employment can inadvertently and invisibly change the role they
play in the community.
Moonlighting also raises conceptual concerns about democratic legitimacy with regard to the role of the police in the community. Unlike
most other government agents and all private employees, uniformed police officers are representatives “not just for their respective agencies, but
for government, law, and justice more generally.”208 As one police chief
writes, “the public sees the police as community leaders and community
ambassadors.”209 The presence of those uniformed community leaders
and ambassadors at a private business can send a very different message
than the presence of a security guard or un-uniformed employee, suggesting a level of official involvement or endorsement that reflects not
just on the private employer, but on the police agency and local government. On the one hand, moonlighting may bring community members
greater exposure to and interaction with officers, who would not otherwise be working at a grocery store or nightclub or living at a particular
apartment complex. On the other hand, that exposure may be problematic. When a police officer is standing outside of a night club on a Saturday night or stopping traffic so vehicles can leave a church parking on
Sunday morning, their presence and actions go far beyond any purely
private equivalent. Such problems may occur if, for example, club-goers
208. Stoughton, Incidental Regulation, supra note 56, at 2188.
209. Del Manak, Officer Safety Through Offender Management, POLICE CHIEF, http://www.
policechiefmagazine.org/officer-safety-through-offender-management/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
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perceive the presence of officers on Latin Night or Hip-Hop Night as an
indication of government or community distrust, or if motorists perceive
an agency as favoring church-related traffic over other drivers. Recall
that the single most common justification for permitting off-duty officers
to work for private employers, offered by forty agencies (30.76% of permissive agencies), was the perceived benefit to community relations.
That justification may be called into question if moonlighting hurts
community relations, or if the benefits are felt primarily or exclusively in
the segments of the community that already have strong ties with the police at the cost of other aspects of the community.
V. CONCLUSION
Moonlighting is a common feature of modern police practices, but
one that relatively little is known about. Survey responses from the 162
participating agencies, which collectively employ just under a fifth of all
state and local officers in the United States, reflect that 80% of agencies
permit uniformed officers to work while off duty and suggest that moonlighting may be far more common than previously appreciated. Yet the
reasons for permitting or prohibiting moonlighting vary widely, as do the
state statutes and agency policies that regulate the practice, suggesting a
significant need for future work.
The private employment of off-duty officers may expand existing
discussions about policing or raise new issues worthy of consideration.
Consider, for example, that almost a quarter of the agencies that permit
moonlighting indicated that they do so in part because the private pay
supplements officer income. Descriptively, that is undoubtedly true, but
it raises a series of additional descriptive and normative questions: are
agencies advertising off-duty employment as a benefit to potential recruits? Is that appropriate? If so, would doing so affect recruitment efforts? Separate and apart from recruitment, how many agencies receive
pay for private, off-duty employment and channel it to the officer? To
what extent, if any, should that private pay affect the calculation of an officer’s retirement benefits?
Further, many of the justifications for prohibiting or permitting offduty employment are open to empirical analysis. A quarter of the agencies that permit moonlighting indicated that they do so in part because it
improves agency staffing: off-duty officers can respond to events that
would otherwise require an on-duty officer to respond. Future research
might examine whether private, off-duty employment has a consistent
effect on calls for service or the distribution of on-duty resources. Moonlighting might well drive down the demand for on-duty resources, but the
picture may be more complicated. Consider two possibilities. First, if offduty officers call for back-up in situations where no officer would be involved without moonlighting, that may increase the demand on on-duty
resources. Second, if off-duty officers make discretionary arrests and
must attend subsequent court proceedings on their days off, they are
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compensated for their time (often at an overtime rate) by the police
agency, not the private employer for whom they were working at the
time of the arrest. When that is the case, the agency may be paying for an
off-duty officer’s actions, reducing the staffing benefit to the agency. Future research could quantify many other justifications for or against
moonlighting, from the effect on police/community relations and public
safety to the risk of litigation and liability.
Deeper attention to moonlighting may also encourage an appropriately interdisciplinary approach to police research. There is clearly ample
room for legal scholars to address some of the questions raised by private, off-duty employment, but understanding policing also requires the
attention of criminologists, social and cognitive psychologists, political
scientists, and scholars from other disciplines, who can apply a variety of
methodologies to study how moonlighting affects officers, civilians, police agencies, private businesses, communities, the criminal justice system, the legal system, and so on.
More attention to the private employment of off-duty officers is also
needed to develop a set of evidence-based best practices. The empirical
research suggested above could provide a more informed body of
knowledge that agencies and police executives could draw on when deciding whether to allow and how to regulate moonlighting. Even without
new research, police executives and scholars can apply existing work to
questions about the regulation of moonlighting. The research on shift
work and fatigue, for example, suggests that agencies that permit officers
to work eighteen hours in a day or 112 hours in a week may be increasing
the potential for poor decision making, putting officers and civilians at
risk, and increasing the locality’s exposure to liability. Not all questions
may have easily quantifiable answers, of course, but additional study and
attention in this area is critical to the development of best practices for
this long-standing and important aspect of modern policing.
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